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SISYPHUS*, THE BOULDER, AND THE CHOICE-OF-LAW
HILL: THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
RESOLVING THE UNUSUAL AND COMPLEX
CHOICE-OF-LAW ISSUES THAT CAN ARISE WHEN
THE UNITED STATES IS A PARTY IN AN AVIATION CASE
RODNEY PATTON**
I. INTRODUCTION
D EAN PROSSER famously observed that the law of conflicts
was a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and
inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize
about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible
jargon."' Indeed, perhaps more so than any other subject in the
law, the law of conflicts is the province of the law professor. But
it must be our province too. If law professors inhabit the dismal
swamp of conflicts-of-law, then we trial attorneys are fighting in
the sucking mud of the trenches in that swamp. Without the
* Sisyphus is the "legendary figure doomed in the underworld to rolling a
boulder up an incline and forever failing to surmount its crest." HO\IER, THE
OrwSSE, 539 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books Deluxe ed. 1996). He appears
in the Kingdom of the Dead in The Odyssey thus:
And I saw Sisyphus too, bound to his own torture
grappling his monstrous boulder with both arms working,
heaving, hands struggling, legs driving, he kept on
thrusting the rock uphill toward the brink, but just
as it teetered, set to topple over-
time and again
the immense weight of the thing would wheel it back and
the ruthless boulder would bound and tumble down to the plain
again-
so once again he would heave, would struggle to thrust it tIp,
sweat drenching his body, dust swirling above his head.
Id. at 269.
** Rodney Patton is a trial attorney with the United States Department of
Justice, representing the United States in aviation and admiralty litigation. The
views expressed in this article are his alone and do not necessarily represent the
views of the United States Department of Justice.
I W. Prosser, Ilntertate Publication, 51 Michi. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
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luxury of time (or indeed the inclination) to pontificate on is-
sues such as whether to maintain methodological purity,2 we
must persuade courts (within the bounds of ethics) to choose
the substantive law that favors our clients. To succeed, we need
both a journeyman's practical understanding of this most com-
plex subject matter, along with perhaps a dash of academic
insight.
This article seeks to achieve the elusive blending of practical
instruction and academic discourse in the limited context of
how the, United States' presence as a party in an aviation case
can create some unusual and complex choice-of-law issues.3 In-
deed, the issues can become so complex and the analysis so con-
voluted that counsel may feel like Sisyphus, doomed to his own
torture of pushing the analytical boulder up the choice-of-law
hill forever. But this need not be your fate. This article pro-
vides you with the analytical framework to resolve these choice-
of-law issues, giving you the strength to finally topple the boul-
der over the summit. After Part II of this article outlines the
various choice-of-law approaches applied across this country,
Parts III and IV will consider how a choice-of-law analysis can
differ from the norm when the United States is a party in both a
garden-variety aviation case and in a more complex aviation
case. In each of these Parts, the article will explore examples,
demonstrating to the practitioner how such choice-of-law analy-
ses can significantly affect the ultimate issue of who will be left
holding the proverbial baby when it comes time to enter judg-
ment in the case. But first, a few words on the confusing
cacophony of choice-of-law approaches an aviation trial attorney
is likely to encounter.
2 See, e.g, Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution in the
Courts: Today and Tomorrow, 298 HAGUE ACAD. INT'L L. RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 432
n. 1642 [hereinafter Symeonides, The American Choice-ofLaw Revolution] ("Method-
ological or philosophical purity should not be an end in itself when dealing with
complex multi-state problems that by definition implicate conflicting national
and societal values.").
3 For a practical discussion and some good insight into how to handle choice-
of-law issues under the Second Restatement in the context of commercial air
crash litigation, see generally John B. Austin, A General Framework for Analyzing
Choice-of-Law Problems in Air Crash Litigation, 58J. AIR L. & CoMi. 909 (1993). Also,
for practical insight and an overview of issues raised in general aviation crashes,
see generally Desmond T. Barry, Jr., Choice of Law Problems in General Aviation
Accident Cases: Liability and Damages, 312 P.L.I. LITIG. 65 (1986). For a state-by-
state overview of choice-of-law approaches, see MichaelJ. Harrington, A Review of
State, Diversity jurisdiction, and FFCA Decisions Concerning Choice of Law Rules in the




"Once upon a time, there existed in the United States a
choice-of-law system,"' a fairy-tale time when choice-of-law rules
were rules and their application was uniform. Now there is
chaos.5 Although the "wicked witch" of rigid, territorial-based
rules is not dead yet but lives on in a handful of jurisdictions,
the uniformity of the old-rules system has given way to a patch-
work quilt of various choice-of-law approaches. Dean Symeon C.
Symeonides, a leading conflicts scholar,6 annually classifies each
American jurisdiction's choice-of-law approach and identifies
them with one of seven methodological camps,7 including tradi-
tional, interest analysis, Second Restatement, most significant
contacts, lexfori, better law, and combined modern.' Although
such a classification system is "not an exact science,"' his classifi-
cations should be a point of departure for every aviation attor-
ney assigned the thankless task of researching the choice-of-law
approach of an unfamiliar jurisdiction."' We turn now to these
classifications.
4 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 34.
5 See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restate-
ment: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REV. 1248, 1250 (1997) [hereinafter Symeo-
nides, Judicial Acceptance] (referring to the "current anarchic state of American
conflicts law"); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for
Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 11 (1991) [hereinafter Gottesman,
Draining the Dismal Swamp] ("Most conflict scholars decry the present chaotic
state of affairs."); see also BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 602 (1996)
(Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that modern "interest analysis" in
choice-of-law jurisprudence "has laid waste the formerly comprehensible field of
conflict of laws").
6 Dean Symeonides writes frequently on choice-of-law issues and "probably has
read more American choice-of-law decisions than anyone." William M. Richman
& David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the Twenty-ifth Anniversay
of its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196, 1208
n.76 (1997).
7 See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2004:
Eighteenth Annual Survey, 52 AM.j. CoMp. L. 919, 942-48 (2004) [hereinafter Syme-
onides, 2004 Annual Survey].
s See, e.g., Symeonides, 2004 Annual Surve., supra note 7, at 942-48.
q Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 89-90.
10 These annual surveys have been labeled "invaluable." Louise Weinberg, The-
ory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MiCi. L. Rv.. 1631, 1632 (2005).
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A. TRADITIONAL CHOICE-OF-LAw RULES
There are ten states 1 currently classified as "traditional,"
meaning those jurisdictions that still cling (with varying degrees
of enthusiasm) to the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws. In
tort cases, these traditional choice-of-law rules generally seek to
apply the substantive law of one jurisdiction based on a single
connecting factor-the place of the wrong (the lex loci delicti),
which is usually the place where the injury occurred because
that is the last element necessary to make the tortfeasor liable. 12
This system was one "of rigid, territorially based, multilateral,
jurisdiction-selecting, choice-of-law rules intended to provide le-
gal certainty, attain conflicts justice, and promote interstate uni-
formity of result regardless of forum."'" These "rules get cases
settled quickly and cheaply."14 Nevertheless, their rigidity has
led some "traditional" courts to create and stretch exceptions to
avoid what are perceived to be unjust results. 5 For example, in
Mills v. Quality Supplier Trucking, Inc., 6 the West Virginia Su-
preme Court stretched its public policy exception and refused
to apply the contributory negligence rule of the lex loci delicti
and instead applied the forum state's comparative fault rule.' 7
With such an apparently expansive public policy exception in a
nation of "balkanized" tort law, counsel should be prepared to
1i These states are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Symeonides,
2004 Annual Survey, supra note 7, at 943-44.
12 Harrington, supra note 3, at 3; Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp, supra
note 5, at 3-4; Robert J. Witte, . . . Or Would You Rather Have What's Behind Door
Number Two? Uniform Choice of Law Proposals: Big Deal of the Day or Just Another
Zonk?, 59J. AIR L. & COM. 617, 623 (1994); see also, e.g., Thomas v. FMC Corp.,
610 F. Supp. 912, 913-14 (M.D. Ala. 1985); IBM Corp. v. Kemp, 536 S.E.2d 303,
306 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Brown v. Kleen Kut Mfg. Co., 714 P.2d 942, 944 (Kan.
1986); Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 606 A.2d 295, 300-02 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1992); Torres v. New Mexico, 894 P.2d 386, 390 (N.M. 1995);
Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 853-54 (N.C. 1988); Boone v. Boone,
546 S.E.2d 191, 193 (S.C. 2001);Jones v. R.S. Jones & Assocs., 431 S.E.2d 33, 34
(Va. 1993); McKinney v. Fairchild Int'l, Inc., 487 S.E.2d 913, 922 (W. Va. 1997);
Jack v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 899 P.2d 891, 894 (Wyo. 1995).
13 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 413-14.
14 Paul v. Nat'l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 554 (W. Va. 1987).
15 See generally, e.g., Mills v. Quality Supplier Trucking, Inc., 510 S.E.2d 280 (W.
Va. 1998). Of course, the more expansive the exceptions to these rules, the less
predictability the rules provide as counsel and courts struggle to define the pa-
rameters of these exceptions.
16 Mills, 510 S.E.2d at 282.
17 Id. at 282-83.
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argue that the law of the lex loci violates the forum's public pol-
icy any time the forum law is more favorable.'"
B. MODERN CHOICE-OF-LAW APPRIZOACHES
Over the last four or five decades, the First Restatement's
choice-of-law system has eroded, with a total of forty-two jurisdic-
tions (including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico)
abandoning the traditional rule and embracing a plethora of
modern choice-of-law approaches, each vying for territory on
the methodological map."'
1. Government Interest Analysis
Brainerd Currie fathered the "government interest" analysis
and is responsible for so much of what is right21 and what is
wrong2 l with today's modern conflicts law. Contrary to the First
Restatement's content-neutral approach to choosing what law to
apply, Currie introduced the content-specific concept of state or
governmental interests to the field of American conflicts law,
postulating that courts should "ascertain whether each of the
involved states would wish to apply their respective laws" by "ex-
amini[ing] the content of the conflicting laws" and determining
"whether the involved states have an interest in applying their
law."' 22 Currie believed state interests controlled the choice-of-
law analyses and that the interests of private litigants and the
federal system were irrelevant."3 Like the spice, many jurisdic-
tions have found that too much Currie analysis can ruin the dish
of a choice-of-law approach, and so many states have adopted
Currie's central thesis that state interests matter, but have de-
clined to make this the sole criterion in their choice-of-law ap-
proaches. 4 For example, Currie's "state interest" analysis can
be seen in the Second Restatement and in the "combined mod-
ern" approaches, although the "interest analyses" of California,
18 See id.
Syrmeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 66.
20 According to Dean Symeonides, Currie was "fundamentally correct" in mak-
ing state interests the basis for resolving conflict of laws. Symeonides, The Ame-
can Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 50.
21 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has complained that the choice-of-law
approach involving interest balancing is "maddeningly indefinite." Carter v.
United States, 333 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2003).
22 Syrneonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 361.
,23 Id. at 40-43, 382.
24 Id. at 98, 361, 383.
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New Jersey, and the District of Columbia come closest to the
central thesis of his approach.2"
The District of Columbia's rules are a "constructive blending"
of the Second Restatement and the "governmental interests" ap-
proaches.26 Under this approach, courts identify the govern-
mental policies underlying the laws in conflict and determine
which state's policy would be most advanced by having its law
applied.27 To evaluate the state with the stronger interest, a
court considers the four contact-factors from section 145 of the
Second Restatement. 28 Additionally, NewJersey "applies a flexi-
ble 'governmental-interest' standard, which requires application
of the law of the state with the greatest interest in resolving the
particular issue that is raised in the underlying litigation. '29 The
NewJersey courts determine which state has a greater interest by
identifying the governmental policies underlying the applicable
law of each state and deciding how these "'policies are affected
by each state's contacts to the litigation and to the parties. "'30
Finally, California's choice-of-law approach is borrowed from
Professor William F. Baxter's "comparative impairment" theory,
which "weighs the loss that would result from subordinating the
interests of one state to those of another state"'" and applies the
law of the state whose interest would be more impaired if its laws
were not applied to the particular issue. 2
2. Second Restatement
The Second Restatement, known as the "most significant rela-
tionship" test, dominates conflicts law with twenty-two jurisdic-
tions following this approach in tort cases. 3 3 But this statistic
tells only half the tale. The Second Restatement is not uni-
25i Unlike the approaches he inspired, Currie believed that judges should not
attempt to weigh the interests of the states involved and should instead apply the
law of the forum when a true conflict existed. Id. at 45.
26 Hercules v. Shama Rest. Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 41 n.18 (D.C. 1989).
27 See, e.g., Raflo v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2001).
28 Id.
29 Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106, 109 (NJ. 1996).
30 See id. at 485 (quoting Veazey v. Doremus, 510 A.2d 1187, 1189 (NJ. 1986)).
31 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 51.
32 Tucci v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401, 407 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001).
-3 These states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 91; see also
Symeonides, 2004 Annual Survey, supra note 7, at 944.
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formly applied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction or even within a
single jurisdiction. 4  This is because there are gradations of
commitment to this approach,"5 and some courts are unwilling
or unable to apply the Second Restatement as the drafters in-
tended." Thus, counsel should carefully review the leading
choice-of-law cases in the applicable Second Restatement juris-
diction before resorting to a generic "most significant relation-
ship" analysis.
The "most significant relationship" test "works through three
related functions.'3 7 First, section six-the "cornerstone of the
Restatement Second"' '-contains a "dispositive priority to the
forum's statutory choice-of-law rules" and a list of non-exclusive
policies intended to identify the state with the most significant
relationship if there is no dispositive statutory rule."9 These
"policies are broader and qualitatively different"40 from those
advocated by Brainerd Currie.4 Moreover, in the Second Re-
statement analysis, state interests are only a factor to be bal-
anced against other policies, while in government interest
jutisdictions, state interests "drive the analysis."4  Therefore,
counsel should be wary of assuming that the Second Restate-
ment and an "interest" analysis are functionally the same or
would produce the same result in each instance.4"
34 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 96 ("One
can find examples of ... disparate treatment of the Restatement even in the same
jurisdiction."); James P. George, False Conflicts & Faulty Analyses: Judicial Misuse of
Governmental Interests in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 23 REv. LrTiic. 489,
490-91 (2004) (noting that the Second Restatement takes "on vastly different
forms in different courts").
35 Symeonides, Judicial Acceptance, supra note 5, at 1262-63, 1268.
:'6 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 96
("[S]ome states prefer to use only the general, open-ended, and flexible sections
of the Restatement (such as §§ 145, 187 and especially § 6) and avoid using the
specific sections that contain mildly confining presumptive rules."); Gottesman,
Draining the Dismal Swamp, supra note 5, at 9-10 ("[T]here is widespread diver-
gence in the way that various states apply the second Restatement."); George,
supra note 34, at 526 ("[S]tates using the Second Restatement do not necessarily
employ the same methods, some using it for contacts counting, some for territo-
rial preferences, and some for interest balancing.").
37 George, supra note 34, at 519.
8 Symeonides, The American Choiceof-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 59.
:' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971); George, supra
note 34, at 519.
41 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 59.
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Second, in tort cases, there are four contacts (familiar to most
counsel) that must be "taken into account in applying the prin-
ciples of [Section] 6."" Significantly, "[t]hese contacts are to be
evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to
the particular issue,"45 which demonstrate that the Second Re-
statement (like most but not all modern approaches) embraces
an issue-by-issue choice-of-law analysis.46 This issue-by-issue ap-
proach is considered a major breakthrough in modern choice-
of-law analysis4 7 and is "widely practiced by American courts."48
The approach can lead to the laws of different states applying to
different issues within the same cause of action,49 a result known
as the French term "depecage."5 °
Finally, the Second Restatement contains numerous sections
applying to specific torts such as personal injury5 and to specific
issues such as the standard of care.52 Counsel should search
these sections to determine if any are applicable to the specific
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). These four
contacts are (1) the place where the injury occurred, (2) the place where the
conduct occurred, (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion, and place of business of the parties, and (4) the place where the relation-
ship between the parties is centered. Id.
45 Id.
46 For example, although Indiana is designated a modern approach state be-
cause it applies a "most significant contacts" approach when the lex loci delicti
bears little connection to the action, its supreme court recently refused to incor-
porate an issue-by-issue approach into its choice-of-law methodology. Simon v.
United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 801-03 (Ind. 2004). For a critique of Indiana's
rejection of "one of the breakthroughs of modern choice-of-law analysis," see
Symeonides, 2004 Annual Survey, supra note 7, at 944-48.
47 Symeonides, 2004 Annual Survey, supra, note 7, at 947.
48 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 132; see,
e.g., In reAir Crash Disaster, 644 F.2d 594, 611 (7th Cir. 1981) (approving of an
issue-by-issue approach and of the resulting depecage).
49 Symeonides, 2004 Annual Survey, supra note 7, at 946.
50 According to Dean Symeonides, "Depecage is the application ... of the laws
of different states to different issues in the same cause of action .... " Symeo-
nides, 2004 Annual Survey, supra note 7, at 946; see also Symeonides, The American
Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 132-33. Depecage is "a natural conse-
quence, and an appropriate recognition, of the fact that the states involved in the
case may be interested in different aspects of it or interested in varying degrees."
Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 133. Although
an issue-by-issue analysis can lead to depecage, this is not always the result be-
cause the court may determine that the same state's laws apply to the entire cause
of action even after an issue-by-issue analysis.
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 146 (1971); see also George,
supra note 34, at 520.
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 157 (1971); see also George,
supra note 34, at 520.
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issue under consideration before relying on the general tort
principles in conjunction with evaluating the policies under sec-
tion 6.
The Second Restatement has certainly complicated the
court's basic task of determining what law to apply in each case,
resulting in unpredictability, delay, and administrative ineffi-
ciency.51 Moreover, Second Restatement courts must struggle
with the same problems as "government interest"jurisdictions in
trying to determine the policies underlying the laws of poten-
tially interested states, which has been aptly compared to "skeet
shooting with a bow and arrow. ' 54 Such an ethereal task is
fraught with more intellectual danger when the underlying law's
purposes are obscure.5 New York'sJudge Breitel once observed
the following in dissent: "Intramural speculation on the policies
of other States has obvious limitations because of restricted in-
formation and wisdom. It is difficult enough to interpret the
statutes and decisional rules of one's own State. ' 56 A court's
ability to consciously or unconsciously manipulate such policies,
when combined with the Second Restatement's almost infinite
flexibility, can lead to the perception that too often the ap-
proach simply provides a curtain of legitimacy behind which the
court-like the Wizard of Oz-pulls unseen levers to achieve
the desired result.
5 7
Perhaps because the Second Restatement sought to cherry-
pick from the conflicting choice-of-law theories of multilateral-
ism and unilateralism and blend them into one approach,5 s the
Second Restatement has been harshly and roundly criticized as
, Michael H. Gottesman, Adrift on the Sea of Indeterminacy, 75 IND. L.J. 527, 528-
29 (2000) [hereinafter Gottesman, Adrift]; see also Gottesman, Draining the Dismal
Swamp, supra note 5, at 8.
54 Fisher v. Huck, 624 P.2d 177, 178 (Ore. Ct. App. 1981).
55 George, supra note 34, at 515.
Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 411 (N.Y. 1969) (Breitel,J., dissenting); see
also George, supra note 34, at 515.
5 Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. LJ. 403, 405-06
(2000) (stating that the Second Restatement "furnished courts with any number
of plausible reasons to support whatever results they wished to reach").
'1 Symeonides, The Amercan Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 61
("[Tihe Restatement's approach is a blend of multilateralism and unilateral-
ism."); Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp, supra note 5, at 8 ("The second
Restatement . . .was a hodgepodge of all theories."); Juenger, supra note 57, at
405-06 (The Second Restatement mixed "together all manner of doctrinal cUr-
rents"); George, supra note 34, at 519 ("The Second Restatement is eclectic, com-
bining what its drafters believed to be the best of several choice-of law
methodologies.").
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"mishmash,"59 "gibberish,' 60 and "a cacophonous formula of for-
mulae, a blend of indeterminate indeterminacy."'" In the final
analysis, the kindest thing that can be said about this approach
is that it is the worst choice-of-law approach, except for all those
other approaches that have been tried.6 2
3. Most Significant Contacts
Three jurisdictions follow the "most significant contacts" ap-
proach when deciding tort choice-of-law issues.6" Most practi-
tioners could be forgiven for confusing the "most significant
contacts" approach with the Second Restatement's "most signifi-
cant relationship" approach.64 However, the two are different.
Although both approaches tend to rely on the same factors, the
significant contacts approach considers the factual contacts
alone, without reference to any set of policies or state interests,
whereas the Second Restatement test considers and evaluates
similar contacts in light of the policies set forth in section 6.65
This means that the most significant contacts approach can
come perilously close to simple contact counting despite protes-
tations to the contrary.6 6 For example, Indiana is classified as a
"most significant contacts" approach jurisdiction,67 and that
state has recently confirmed the correctness of this classification
by eschewing the policy-balancing of the Second Restatement, as
it instead prefers to count contacts and evaluate them with refer-
59 Juenger, supra note 57, at 405.
60 Id. at 403. As one seasoned practitioner observed, courts are required under
the Second Restatement approach "to compare apples, oranges, umbrellas, and
pandas, and determine which state's law to apply by the relative importance as-
signed to these factors." Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp, supra note 5, at 8.
61 Gottesman, Adrift, supra note 53, at 527.
62 This is a paraphrase of Sir Winston Churchill's famous remark that "democ-
racy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried."
Winston Churchill, http://www/quotationspage.com/quotes/SirWinston_
Churchill/Il (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
63 These jurisdictions are Indiana, North Dakota, and Puerto Rico. Symeo-
nides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 130.
64 See, e.g., id. at 395 ("Some courts engage in contact-counting even when ap-
plying the Second Restatement, which contemplates a content-oriented
selection.").
65 Symeonides, Judicial Acceptance, supra note 5, at 1283 n.159; see also Symeo-
nides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 129-30.
66 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 129-30.
67 See Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 805-07 (Ind. 2004) (reiterating
that Indiana's choice-of-law rule follows the lex loci delicti unless the tort bears
little connection to the action, in which case the law of the state with the most
significant contacts will apply).
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ence to how the contacts relate to each cause of action, not with
reference to the policies of each interested state."8
4. Lex Fori Approach
Kentucky, Michigan, and Nevada follow the lexfori approach
and apply the law of the forum in the majority of cases, enshrin-
ing the forum court's natural tendency to apply its own law.69
For example, Kentucky will apply its own law in a case so long as
there are significant-not necessarily the most significant-con-
tacts with Kentucky. 1 Similarly, in Nevada, the law of the lexfori
governs "unless another state has an overwhelming interest, 71
determined not by Currie-like interest analysis, but by the other
state having at least two of four geographical contacts that Ne-
vada borrowed and modified from section 145 of the Second
Restatement.7 2 Finally, Michigan courts will apply their own law
presumptively unless there is a "rational reason" for applying an-
other state's law, determined by considering whether the other
state has an interest in having its law applied and whether Michi-
gan's interests mandate that its law be applied anyway.7 ' Al-
though the lex fon approach is methodologically dissimilar to
Brainerd Currie's "interest analysis" approach, it usually
"'s See id. at 803. For criticism of this approach as turning "the clock back to the
time of the first Restatement," see Symeonides, 2004 Annual Survey, supra note 7,
at 944-48.
69 Svmeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 98-99,
103-09.
7 Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972). As the Sixth Circuit has
observed, "Kentucky courts have apparently applied Kentucky substantive law
whenever possible." Harris Corp. v. COMAIR, Inc., 712 F.2d 1069, 1071 (6th Cir.
1983); see also Wallace Hardware Co. v. Abrams, 223 F.3d 382, 391 (6th Cir. 2000)
(noting the "egocentric" and "provincial tendency in Kentucky choice-of-law
rules").
71 Motenko v. MGM Dist., Inc., 921 P.2d 933, 935 (Nev. 1996).
72 1d.; see also Nw. Pipe Co. v. Eighth .Iud. Dist. Ct., 42 P.3d 244, 245 (Nev.
2002). According to one observer, "lt] he four factors that the majority listed [in
Motenko] . . . are detached from any of the policies supporting the laws of the
involved non-forum states." Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and
Forum Shopping, International and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEx. INTi'L L.J. 559, 572-73
(2002); see also Nw. Pipe Co., 42 P.3d at 247 (Agosti, J., dissenting) (noting that
Nevada "borrowed and modified section 145 of the Restatement" but did not
permit "a court to consider the important policy questions" in choice-of-law issues
because the "Motenko test does not incorporate the specific reference in sections
146 and 175 to the policy considerations of section 6(2)").
73 Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd., 562 N.W.2d 466, 471 (Mich.
1997).
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achieves his preferred result-the application of the forum's
law.7 4
5. Professor Leflar's "Better Law" Approach
To greater or lesser degrees, five states continue to follow the
so-called "better law" approach to choice-of-law issues. 75 Profes-
sor Leflar proposed five "choice-influencing considerations" to
guide a court when facing choice-of-law problems: "(1) predict-
ability of results, (2) maintenance of interstate and international
order, (3) simplification of the judicial task, (4) advancement of
the forum's governmental interest, and (5) the application of
the 'better rule of law.' ",76 Although only one of five considera-
tions, the "better law" criterion became associated with this ap-
proach, probably because it was the "decisive criterion in all the
close cases" and because the other considerations differ little
from those set forth in the Second Restatement's section 6.77 By
allowing judges to choose what each believes to be the "better
law," this approach necessarily legitimizes 'judicial subjectivism"
and promotes "pro-forum law" bias, "pro-plaintiff/pro-recovery"
bias, and "pro-forum litigant" bias.75 Such biases are now "less
pronounced" because "most of the states that initially adopted
Leflar's approach have already begun to combine it with other
approaches, and to de-emphasize the better-law factor. ' 79 As a
result, counsel would be well advised to cite the appropriate
state's most recent pronouncement on choice-of-law to ensure
the proper emphasis on the "better law" criterion specifically
and generally on the set of choice-influencing factors."s
74 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 99.
75 These five states are Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
and Wisconsin. See id. at 91, 109-10; see also Symeonides, 2004 Annual Survey,
supra note 7, at 944.
76 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 52.
77 Id. at 53.
78 Id. at 54, 110-12.
79 Id. at 114. Rhode Island and Minnesota have the most eclectic approaches.
Id.
80 See, e.g., Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d 91, 94
(Minn. 2000) (confusing Minnesotan conflicts scholars everywhere); Cribb v. Au-
gustyn, 696 A.2d 285, 288 (R.I. 1997) (combining three choice-of-law
approaches).
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6. "Combined Modern" Approach
Dean Symeonides classifies Hawaii,' Louisiana , Massachu-
settsj New York, 4 Oregon, 5 and Pennsylvaniax" (the six re-
"I Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586, 593 (Haw. 1981) ("The preferred analysis, in
our opinion, would be an assessment of the interests and policy factors involved
with a purpose of arriving at a desirable result in each situation."); see aLso Mikel-
son v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 111 P.3d 601, 608 n.6 (Haw. 2005) (noting that
Peters referenced the Second Restatement, the governmental interests approach,
and Professor Leflar's approach, but that Hawaii's choice-of-law approach as-
sesses the interests and policies of the states involved rather than follows an, one
particular methodological approach).
82 Louisiana is an odd duck regarding choice-of-law issues. The Louisiana Civil
Code provides that state's choice-of-law approach, not case law. See, e.g., LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 3515 (1994) (setting forth the residual rule for choice-of-law is-
sties in Louisiana):
[A]n issue in a case having contacts with other states is governed by
the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired
if its law were not applied to that issue. That state is determined by
evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of
all involved states in the light of: (1) the relationship of each state
to the parties and the dispute; and (2) the policies and needs of the
interstate and international systems, including the policies of up-
holding the justified expectations of parties and of minimizing the
adverse consequences that might follow from subjecting a party to
the law of more than one state...
Dean Symeonides drafted the choice-of-law approach for Louisiana.
813 Cosine v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., 632 N.E.2d 832, 834 (Mass. 1994) (not-
ing that Massachusetts "takes a functional approach" and uses "established con-
flicts criteria and considerations" but does not follow any partictilar doctrine,
preferring instead to decide choice-of-law issues by assessing choice-influencing
considerations, including those from the Second Restatement and various
scholars).
81 See, e.g., Padula v. Lilarn Prop. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. 1994):
New York utilizes interest analysis to determine which of two com-
petingjurisdictions has the greater interest in having its law applied
in the litigation. The greater interest is determined by an evalua-
tion of the 'facts or contacts which . . .relate to the purpose of the
particular law in conflict.' Two separate inquiries are thereby re-
quired to determine the greater interest: (1) what are the signifi-
cant contacts and in which jurisdiction are they located; and, (2)
whether the purpose of the law is to regulate conduct or allocate
loss.
(quoting Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. 1985))
(citation omitted).
815 Tower v. Schwabe, 585 P.2d 662, 663 (Or. 1978) (noting that Oregon had
adopted the Second Restatement test but that it engaged in a false conflict analy-
sis first, based exclusively on an interests and policy analysis); Erwin v. Thomas,
506 P.2d 494, 494-98 (Or. 1973) (establishing that Oregon will not look to the
contacts set forth in the Second Restatement unless two states' policies and inter-
ests are involved and conflict); Dabbs v. Silver Eagle Mfg. Co., 779 P.2d 1104,
1105-06 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that Oregon's threshold analysis is to com-
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maining jurisdictions) as 'following a "combined modern"
approach to choice-of-law issues in tort cases." Although more
than these six jurisdictions could be classified as eclectic, in that
many courts from time to time have judicially mixed choice-of-
law methodologies, this classification is reserved only for those
jurisdictions where more than one modern methodology is
"overtly, knowingly, and repeatedly" combined. 88 Broad de-
scriptions ofthese "combined modern" approaches are perilous
because, by their very nature, each state's approach constitutes
that particular state's blend of choice-of-law methodologies.
Pennsylvania is a good example. Almost twenty years ago, Greg-
ory Smith described Pennsylvania's choice-of-law approach in a
law review article as being "convoluted" and "eclectic," having
applied at various times "the First and Second Restatements, the
center of gravity approach, interest analysis and Professor
Cavers' 'principles of preference.' '"89 Currently, Pennsylvania
applies a "flexible conflicts methodology"9 ° that is a hybrid of
the Second Restatement and "interest analysis."91
Pennsylvania begins its choice-of-law approach with an analy-
sis of the policies of the interested states to determine if there is
a false conflict, a true conflict, or whether the case falls into
Brainerd Currie's "unprovided-for" category.9 2 A false conflict
exists when only one of the relevant jurisdiction's governmental
interests would be impaired by the application of another state's
law.93 Under these circumstances, that state will provide the law
applicable to the particular issue.94 If none of the jurisdiction's
pare the interests and policies of the states to determine if they conflict); Fisher v.
Huck, 624 P.2d 177, 178 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that after Oregon adopted
the Second Restatement for choice-of-law issues, "the choice of law has been
based upon somewhat amorphous considerations, the evaluation of which de-
pends in large measure on the semantics used by the court making the particular
decision").
86 Garcia v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., 421 F.3d 216, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2005) (apply-
ing Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules and setting forth Pennsylvania's hybrid
approach).
87 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 91-92, 94;
see also Symeonides, 2004 Annual Survey, supra note 7, at 944.
8 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 94.
89 Gregory E. Smith, Choice-of-Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 1041,
1131 (1987).
90 Polt v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 585 F. Supp. 796, 798 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
91 Garcia, 421 F.3d at 220; Kirschbaum v. WRGSB Assocs., 243 F.3d 145, 151
(3d Cir. 2001).





interests would be impaired, then this is an unprovided-for case,
and the law of the place where the tort occurred will control the
case. 9 5 Finally, if there is a true conflict, then the applicable law
is that of the place having the most significant contacts or rela-
tionship with the issues9
For the remaining five states, the practitioner should consult
the law set forth in the footnotes as a starting point for research
into those states' particular choice-of-law approaches, bearing in
mind that the most recent case law also should be consulted
since these approaches tend to morph over time.
C. CONCLUSION
Courts have made these classifications hazardous by often us-
ing distinct doctrines interchangeably, producing a choice-of-
law phenomenon known as 'judicial eclecticism."97 Neverthe-
less, practitioners should still become students of these various
methodologies because the distinctions between them some-
times have a significant impact on the outcome of litigation.9"
At the very least, because choice-of-law motions often "will have
a drastic effect on settlement potential,"'9 these methodological
classifications should provide a valuable starting point for a
practitioner before taking the plunge into the unfamiliar waters
of a choice-of-law approach.""'
III. WHEN UNCLE SAM IS THE ONLY DEFENDANT IN A
GARDEN-VARIETY AVIATION CASE
A Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") claim against the United
States can produce a choice-of-law surprise for the unwary prac-
titioner because the choice-of-law rules chosen may differ from
the rules that would otherwise apply in a case against a private
defendant. When a plaintiff files a diversity action against an
aircraft manufacturer arising out of an airplane crash, the
95 Id.
Id.
97 Juenger, sur/a note 57, at 411; see also Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law
Revolution, supra note 2, at 94.
911 Symeonides, 2004 Annual Survey, supra note 7, at 944; see also Simon v.
United States, 341 F.3d 193, 200 (3d Cir. 2003); Schalliol v. Fare, 206 F. Supp. 2d
689, 695 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 803-04 (Ind.
2004).
99 Harrington, supra note 3, at 10.
10" George, supra note 34, at 501 ("Attorneys wishing to challenge a court's
choice-of-law approach would do well to begin at the beginning and to learn the
lineage of these various choice-of-law methodologies.").
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choice-of-law approach of the forum is automatically applied
pursuant to long-standing Supreme Court precedent.10' This is
not true in FTCA actions. Under the FTCA, the government is
liable for the negligent acts and omissions of its employees
"under circumstances where the United States, if a private per-
son, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred.' 1 2 On its face,
this statutory language appears to be a clear choice-of-law provi-
sion in which Congress decided the substantive law of the place
where the negligent acts or omissions occurred would apply in
an FTCA case, but this simple reading is not how the United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the language. Instead,
the Supreme Court has interpreted this language to mean that
the "whole law" of the state where the alleged negligent act or
omission occurred applies-including its choice-of-law rules. 10 3
As a result, the court will analyze thatjurisdiction's choice-of-law
rules to determine the applicable substantive law, so that the law
which ultimately applies in an FTCA case is not necessarily the
law of the place where the negligent acts or omissions occurred
because that jurisdiction's choice-of-law rules could point the
court to the forum's law or the law of any other interested
jurisdiction.
One example will demonstrate the importance of the differ-
ence between the rule applicable in diversity cases and the rule
applicable in FTCA cases. A pilot receives allegedly negligent
weather information from a flight service station in Indiana
before taking off in instrument meteorological conditions. En
route to his home state of Pennsylvania, the pilot crashes while
still in Indiana. The pilot was earning a high income and was
divorced with adult children. After submitting its administrative
claim and receiving a denial from the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, the pilot's estate files suit against the United States in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Venue is proper in that dis-
10, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
102 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000).
103 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962). For an excellent article on
why Richards' quasi-renvoi approach was ill-advised, see generally James A. Sha-
piro, Choice of Law Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: Richards and Renvoi Revisited, 70
N.C. L. REv. 641 (1992). At least the Court did not torture the language any
further, finding that the "place where the act or omission occurred" meant just
that and did not mean the place where the act or omission had its operative
effect. Richards, 369 U.S. at 9-10.
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trict because the plaintiff resides there." 4 If the case were a di-
versity action against a private defendant, the forum court would
apply Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules,'" probably resulting in
the application of that state's compensatory damages law be-
cause the pilot resides there.1 """ Under Pennsylvania law, the
plaintiff could recover damages arising from the decedent's pre-
death pain and suffering0 7 and for his lost gross earnings.'08
However, Plaintiff could not recover any of these damages
under this hypothetical. Here is why. Under the FTCA, Indi-
ana's choice-of-law rules, not those of the forum, would apply
because the government's alleged negligence occurred in that
state.""' Under Indiana's choice-of-law approach, the substan-
tive law of the place of injury applies to the entire cause of ac-
tion unless that jurisdiction "bears little connection" to the
action."0 In this hypothetical, Indiana is both the place of the
injury (where the crash occurred) and the place where the ac-
tionable negligence occurred, ensuring that Indiana bears more
than a little connection with the cause of action.' As a result,
Indiana choice-of-law rules would select that state's own substan-
tive law to apply to all issues-liability and damages-because
Indiana does not apply an issue-by-issue approach and does not
consider the interest Pennsylvania may have in compensating its
I" In FTCA actions, venue is proper "only in the judicial district where tile
plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred." 28
U.S.C. § 1402(b) (2000). For purposes of venue tinder the FTCA, the language
"where the plaintiff resides" means the residence of the administrator of the de-
cedent's estate. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 2d 688, 691
(M.D.N.C. 1999); Andrade N. Chojnacki, 934 F. Stipp. 817, 829-30 n.23 (S.D. Tex.
1996).
110 Klaxon Co., 313 U.S. at 496.
loO5 See, e.g., Griffith v. United Air L.ines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 807 (Pa. 1964)
(stating that, as "the domicile of decedent and his family," Pennsylvania "is vitally
concerned with the administration of decedent's estate and the well-being of the
surviving dependents to the extent of granting full recovery").
107 Estate of Coleman, 772 A.2d 1026, 1027 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
M)s Shenandoah N. City of Philadelphia, 438 F. StIpp. 981, 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(regarding gross earnings); Kaczkowski N. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d 1027, 1038-39 (Pa.
1980) (regarding no discounting lost income to present value); Estate of Coleman,
772 A.2d at 1027 (regarding lost gross earnings minus maintenance).
1011 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1962).
110 Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. 2004); Hubbard Mfg. Co.
v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ind. 1987); see also judge v. Pilot Oil Corp.,
205 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2000).
III See, e.g.,Judge, 205 F.3d at 337 (finding that Indiana bore more than a little
connection to the action when the negligence and the death occurred in that
state).
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resident decedent.] 12 Under Indiana law, the plaintiff could not
recover any economic loss for the death of a divorced adult with
no dependents."13 Also, like anyone else whose wrongful death
and survival actions are governed by Indiana law, the pilot's con-
scious pain and suffering is not compensable because he died
from the same negligence that caused his personal injuries.14
Although this is an extreme example, a similar but more com-
plex aviation case was recently litigated against the United
States." 15 Counsel for plaintiffs should be aware of the possibil-
ity of similar, though perhaps less dramatic, differences in ex-
pected economic recovery anytime the government's negligence
occurs outside of the forum and the jurisdiction where the negli-
gence occurs applies the lex loci delicti approach (any one of ten
states) 1 6 or any other approach such as Indiana's method that
eschews an issue-by-issue approach or refuses to recognize the
validity of state or governmental interests in the choice-of-law
mix.
IV. WHEN UNCLE SAM IS A CO-DEFENDANT IN A
COMPLEX AVIATION CASE
Choice-of-law issues can become increasingly complex when
the United States is a co-defendant in an aviation case and when
multiple acts of government negligence occur in different juris-
dictions. First, the claims against the United States may need to
be analyzed completely separately from the claims against the
private co-defendant. Second, when the government negli-
gence occurs in more than one jurisdiction, the court must de-
termine which jurisdiction's choice-of-law rules apply to the
claims against the United States. Finally, when those choice-of-
112 Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 798; see also Judge, 205 F.3d at 337; Judge v. Pilot Oil
Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 832, 835-36 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
113 IND. CODE § 34-23-1-2 (2000). Although such an outcome sounds draco-
nian, the legislation was enacted in 1999, apparently "[a]fter years of debate in
the legislature." TammyJ. Meyer & Kyle A. Lansberry, Recent Developments in Indi-
ana Tort Law, 34 IND. L. REv. 1075, 1077-78 (2001). Under this statute, the dece-
dent's loved ones can recover for loss of his love and affection, but the total
award for such damages is capped at $300,000. § 34-23-1-2.
114 IND. CODE § 34-9-3-4 (1999); Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 714 N.E.2d 702,
705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
115 See generally Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2003); Schalliol v.
Fare, 206 F. Supp. 2d 689 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 798.
116 These states are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Symeonides,
2004 Annual Survey, supra note 7, at 943-44.
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law rules are applied to the claims against the United States, one
state's law may apply to the claims against the government, and
another state's law may apply to the claims against the co-defen-
dant, even on a "common issue" such as apportionment of fault.
All of these issues will be addressed below.
A. SEPARATE CHOICE-OF-LAw ANALYSIS FOR CLAiMs AGAINST
THE UNITED STATES
When a plaintiff files an action against the United States and a
co-defendant in ajurisdiction other than the place where one of
the government's allegedly negligent acts or omissions oc-
curred," 7 a court must analyze separately the choice-of-law is-
sues for the FTCA claims in cases where the forum's choice-of-
law approach differs from that of the place where the govern-
ment acts or omissions occurred.' This situation can occur
with some degree of frequency, given that this country is a
patchwork quilt of choice-of-law approaches,'"' and courts os-
tensibly applying the same approach do so in a markedly differ-
ent manner.' 2 Does this separate choice-of-law analysis mean
that one state's substantive law will apply to issues involving the
United States and different substantive law will apply to issues
involving the private-party defendant? Not necessarily. The an-
swer will depend on the facts of the case and the types of choice-
of-law approaches involved.
For example, when the law of the place where the acts or
omissions occurred follows the lex loci delicti approach in tort
choice-of-law decisions, and the forum applies a modern ap-
proach, the law of the place where the injury occurred is appli-
cable to the United States regardless of what choice-of-law rules
117 For venue to be proper against the United States, this jurisdiction must be
the place where the plaintiff resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (2000).
118 See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)
(forum's choice-of-law rules apply in a diversity case); see generally Raflo v. United
States, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4-10 (D.D.C. 2001) (separately analyzing the FTCA
claims and the non-FTCA claims for purposes of the choice-of-law analysis when
the choice-of-law rules of different jurisdictions applied to those two sets of
claims); Clawans v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 2d 368, 371-75 (D.N.. 1999) (ana-
lyzing separately the choice-of-law issues when one state's choice-of-law rules ap-
plied to the pilot and passengers.' FTCA claims and another state's choice-of-law
rules applied to the passengers' state-law claims asserted against the pilot and
owner of the aircraft).
119 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 91-92.
1211 Id. at 96; George, supra note 34, at 490-91.
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or substantive law applies to the private co-defendant. 12 1 Under
these circumstances, the contacts solely related to the claims
against the government should be irrelevant, or at least given
less weight, in the separate choice-of-law analysis performed for
the claims against the co-defendant. 122
The analysis becomes less definitive when both jurisdictions
apply modern, though different, choice-of-law approaches. Be-
cause of the factual variations of each case, and the distinctions
between the numerous modern approaches, no definitive state-
ment can be made regarding the outcome of the two separate
choice-of-law analyses under modern but dissimilar choice-of-law
approaches; however, the court will always need to decide whose
contacts to consider in each of the separate choice-of-law analy-
ses. A court should probably decide whose contacts to consider
based on whether that party has a claim involved in the particu-
lar choice-of-law analysis. For example, a corporation hires a pi-
lot to fly its executives from one business meeting to another.
During one of those flights in which the pilot and two executives
are flying from State A (their home state) to State B, the plane
crashes in State B as a result of pilot error, an avionics malfunc-
tion, and air traffic control negligence in State B. The crash
kills all onboard. In a consolidated action, the estates of the
pilot and passengers sue the United States and the avionics man-
ufacturer in State A, while the avionics manufacturer and the
government sue each other for contribution. The estates of the
passengers cannot sue the corporation that employed the pilot
because of a workers' compensation bar. State A and State B
use dissimilar modern choice-of-law approaches. Under these
circumstances, the pilot, passengers, and the avionics manufac-
turer all have claims against the United States so that their con-
tacts should be considered in the choice-of-law analysis
applicable to the government, while the pilot, passengers, and
United States all have claims against the avionics manufacturer
so that their contacts should be considered in the non-FTCA
choice-of-law analysis. This result is proper even though the
121 See generally Raflo, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 4-11; Clawans, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 372,
374.
122 See, e.g., Clawans, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 374 (noting that, in the separate choice-
of-law analysis for the plaintiffs' claims against the private co-defendants, the resi-
dency of the United States "is entitled to little, if any, weight since the claims
against [the government] will be determined" under another state's law).
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FTCA claims will be tried to a different finder of fact than the
state-law claims. 123
B. SELECTING THE CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES WHEN THE
GOVERNMENT'S NEGLIGENCE OCCURS IN MORE THAN
ONE JURISDICTION
Choice-of-law analyses in diversity cases can become pro-
tracted and complex, but at least counsel and the court know
what choice-of-law rules to apply. 12 4 This is not true in FTCA
cases when a plaintiff alleges a death or injury was caused by
government negligence occurring in more than one jurisdic-
tion. Neither the text of the FTCA'2 5 nor the Act's legislative
history121 shed any light on how to choose the choice-of-law
rules applicable in such cases. 12  The Supreme Court's seminal
decision in Richards v. United States"' is also silent on this is-
sue. 1 29 The Third Circuit stepped into this vacuum, setting forth
a workable three-step process when making choice-of-law deci-
sions under these circumstances.13 "When a case involves mul-
tiple alleged acts or omissions occurring in more than one state,
the FTCA, as construed by Richards, requires the District Court
to engage in a complex conflict of laws analysis to determine
which state law governs the jurisdictional inquiry."' '  The court
12S See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (2000) (providing that FTCA claims are to be tried
without ajurv); FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (2006) (permitting consolidation of actions
involving a common question of law or fact).
124 As noted previously, the court should apply the forum's choice-of-law ap-
proach in diversity cases. See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487, 496 (1941). If the case was transferred from another district, the transferee
court should apply the transferor court's choice-of-law rules when the action was
transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 and the transferee court's choice-of-law
rules when the action was transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406. Piper Air-
craft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 244 n.8 (1981) (applying choice-of-law rules of
transferor court); Doering v. Copper Mountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202, 1209 (10th
Cir. 2001) (stating that choice-of-law rules of transferee court apply after § 1406
transfer).
125 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000).
122 See Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 181 (3d Cir. 2000).
127 Id.
128 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
129 See, e.g., Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1978); Raflo
v. United States, 157 F. StIpp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001); see also Shapiro, supra note 103,
at 669.
130 Gould Elecs., Inc., 220 F.3d at 179-80; see also Schalliol v. Fare, 206 F. Supp. 2d
689, 693-94 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (applying the Third Circuit's approach); Raio, 157 F.
StIpp. 2d at 8-11 (also applying the Third Circuit's three-step approach).
13' Gould Elecs., Inc., 220 F.3d at 179.
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must first ensure that there is not a "false conflict" between the
potentially applicable substantive laws or the respective choice-
of-law approaches. 13 2 Second, assuming that a conflict exists,
the court must "select between the states' respective choice of
law rules."1"' Finally, the court must apply the chosen jurisdic-
tion's choice-of-law approach to "determine which state's sub-
stantive tort law applies.113 4 When a co-defendant is thrown into
the mix, these choice-of-law issues must be separately analyzed1 3 5
so that the analysis can begin to take on epic proportions, 136
placing counsel in the ship with Odysseus to wander aimlessly
for years on a protracted choice-of-lawjourney or on the hillside
with Sisyphus, seemingly eternally condemned to roll the boul-
der of analysis up the choice-of-law hill only for it to roll back
down again.'37
132 Id. at 180. Although the Third Circuit may have been the first court to
delineate a three-step process in a search to root out "false conflicts," other courts
have recognized the importance of false conflicts in avoiding the quagmire of
trying to determine which jurisdiction's choice-of-law approach to apply when
government negligence occurred in more than one jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Suchomajcz v. United States, 465 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (finding no
reason to determine which state's choice-of-law rules to apply when government
negligence could have occurred in either NewYork or Pennsylvania because both
states had "identical choice of law rules" and would apply Pennsylvania substan-
tive law); In re Silver Bridge Disaster Litig., 381 F. Supp. 931, 941-46 (S.D. W. Va.
1974) (finding, in a case involving multiple acts of government negligence in
multiple jurisdictions, that a false conflict existed even though the choice-of-law
rules differed because the applicable substantive laws did not differ).
133 Gould Elecs., Inc., 220 F.3d at 180.
134 Id.
135 See generally Raflo, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 4-11.
136 See id. at 7-8 ("The process of determining which state's choice of law provi-
sion to apply may become as or more complex than determining which state's
substantive law to apply.").
137 My own journey with these issues took several years and involved extensive
briefing before a district court, a federal court of appeals, and a state supreme
court. See generally Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2003); Schalliol
v. Fare, 206 F. Supp. 2d 689 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d
798 (Ind. 2004). Like Odysseus beseeching the lustrous goddess Calypso, I be-
seeched the choice-of-law gods:
Nevertheless, I long-I pine, all my days -
To travel home and see the dawn of my return.
And if a god will wreck me yet again on the wine-dark sea,
I can bear that too, with a spirit tempered to endure.
Much have I suffered, labored long and hard by now
in the waves and wars. Add this to the total -
bring the trial on!
HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 159 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books Deluxe ed. 1996).
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1. Determining Whether a False Conflict Exists
The first step exists to ensure that the last two steps are neces-
sary, by determining whether there is a "false conflict" between
the various choice-of-law approaches and among the potentially
applicable underlying substantive law.' The problem is that
there is no consensus among academics or states on what consti-
tutes a false conflict.' Some courts believe that false conflicts
are limited to situations where the laws of two or more states are
the same or would produce the same result. 40 Other courts and
many scholars believe that false conflicts also exist when the laws
of more than one jurisdiction are different but when only one
state has a legitimate interest in the application of its law,
demonstrated by an examination of the governmental interests
underlying the law of each state.14" ' The latter view can be
traced back to our old friend, Brainerd Currie. He classified
fact patterns into "true conflicts,"12 "apparent conflicts," ''
'38 Gould Elecs., Inc., 220 F.3d at 180-81.
1'19 See, e.g., 16 AM.JuR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 135 (2005); 63B A.t. JuR. 2D Prod-
ucts Liability § 1521 (2005); 19A N.Y.JuR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 3 (2005); 1 CHARLES
KRAUSE & KENT KRAusE, AVIAIION TORT & REc;. LAW § 2:1 (2005).
1411 See, e.g., 16 Am. JuR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 135 (2005); 19A N.Y. JuR. 2D Con-
flict of Laws § 3 (2005); Krause & Krause, supra note 139, § 2:1.
141 See, e.g., Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 187 (3d Cir. 1991) (ap-
plying Pennsylvania's choice-of-law approach and finding that '[a] false conflict
exists if only one jurisdiction's governmental interests would be impaired by the
application of the otherjurisdiction's law."); Raflo, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (applying
the District of Columbia's choice-of-law rules and holding that "[w]hen the policy
of 'State A' would be advanced by application of its own State A law, and the
policy of the other state, 'State B,' would not be advanced by application of State
B's law, a so-called 'false conflict' appears and the law of the interested state,
State A, prevails."); Tucci v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401, 407
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001); 63B AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1521 (2005); 15A C.J.S.
Conflict of Laws § 28 (2005); 10 FLA. JUR. 2 D Conflict of Laws § 2 (2005); 19A N.Y.
JUR. 2t Conflict of Laws § 3 (2005); Krause & Krause, supra note 139; see also Wein-
berg, supra note 10, at 1670 n.32 (finding "[t]he mistaken belief persists that the
technical term 'false conflict' is intended to describe cases in which there is no
conflict because the laws of both concerned states are the same") See generally
Joel S. Perwin, Damage Choice of Law 2 ANN. 2001 ATIA-CLE 1699 (discussing this
type of false conflict).
14n This is when more than one state is interested in the particular issue. Syme-
onides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 44.
143 This occurs when a moderate or restrained definition of policy or interest
would lead to a finding that only one state is truly interested in the issue, even
though more than one state would be constitutionally justified in asserting an
interest. Id. at 44 & n.85.
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"false conflicts' ' 144 and "un-provided for"'145 cases. Under his ap-
proach, state interests are paramount and "a false conflict oc-
curs when the court determines that only one state has a true
interest in the dispute."'146
Currie's approach to false conflicts does not mean there is no
"conflict of laws" problem; instead, it means only that there is no
conflict of governmental interests.14 7 Obviously, this more expan-
sive definition of false conflicts works well if the pertinent
choice-of-law approach is one that worships exclusively at the al-
tar of Currie's governmental interests; however, this type of false
conflict would clash with the traditional choice-of-law approach,
which does not consider state interests and instead applies the
substantive law of the lex loci delicti.'48 Similarly, this type of false
conflict would clash with any modern choice-of-law approach
that eschews consideration of state interests as part of its analy-
sis.149 More significantly, one scholar recently noted that Cur-
rie's approach to false conflicts differs from that of the Second
Restatement, 50 which provides that such state interests are only
one consideration and not a dispositive factor 151 and fails to use
the term "false conflict" at all in its black letter sections or in the
comments, its only allusion to false conflicts being the term's
more traditional meaning, "where the laws of all pertinent states
are the same or would reach the same result. '152 As a result,
"Currie's false conflict [approach] cannot be grafted onto a Sec-
ond Restatement analysis without defeating the latter's essential
function. 1 53  Therefore, practitioners in all aviation cases
should be wary any time opposing counsel tries to graft Currie's
144 This occurs when only one of the relevant states is actually interested in
applying its law to the issue. Id. at 44.
"45 This occurs when none of the relevant states are interested in the particular
issue. Id.
146 George, supra note 34, at 493.
147 LUTHER L. McDoUGAL, III ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw 341 (5th ed.
2001).
148 Krause & Krause, supra note 139, § 2:1 (noting that the more expansive
definition of false conflicts "may well be limited to jurisdictions that have adopted
a flexible interest analysis approach to aviation tort choice-of-law situations as
distinguished from ajurisdiction that adheres to the old, traditional theory of the
lex loci delicti").
149 See, e.g., Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 803-07 (Ind. 2004) (declin-
ing to include an evaluation of states' policies in its choice-of-law mix).
150 George, supra note 34, at 493-94.
51 Id. at 494.
152 Id. at 494, 541 & n.276.
153 Id. at 494.
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"governmental interests" version of "false conflicts" onto the
choice-of-law approach of the relevant jurisdiction, unless that
jurisdiction has specifically adopted that particular definition of
false conflict or follows an approach that focuses exclusively on a
state interest analysis. 
4
For our purposes here, the proper definition of false conflict
is important because it will delineate the parameters of step one
of the three-step analysis. Federal common law-not state law-
should determine what constitutes a false conflict when the is-
sue is which jurisdiction's choice-of-law approach to apply in an
FTCA case involving multiple governmental acts or omissions in
multiple jurisdictions. 15 Because the federal common law fol-
lows the Second Restatement approach to choice-of-law is-
sues,'"" federal courts should apply the Second Restatement's
concept of false conflicts when deciding whether it is necessary
154 For example, "it is somewhat questionable ... whether it is appropriate for
a federal court, sitting in diversity, to adopt such an approach when confronted
with this species of 'false conflict' cases (unless, of course, the forum state's
courts would do likewise)." Fioretti v. Mass. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 53 F.3d 1228,
1234 n.21 (1 th Cir. 1995); see also In reAir Crash Disaster at Boston, 399 F. Supp.
1106, 1122 n.13, 14 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that use of the more expansive view
of false conflicts would be inappropriate in a diversity action unless that was also
the law of the forum state).
1-When an FTCA case involves only acts or omissions in one jirisdiction, that
jurisdiction's definition of a false conflict should control because the FTCA pro-
vides that the government is liable for the negligent acts and omissions of its
employees "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000); Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (interpreting the statutory language to mean the
"whole law" of the place, including its choice-of-law rules).
151i See, e.g., Flores v. Am. Seafoods Co., 335 F.3d 904, 916 (9th Cir. 2003) (quot-
ing Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, Inc., 124 F.3d 1287, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997)) (noting
that federal common law applies to choice-of-law determinations in admiralty
cases and that federal common law follows the Second Restatement); Piamba
Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1296 n.19 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting
that federal common law conflicts rules were those of the Second Restatement);
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Inlet Fisheries, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d
974, 976 (D. Ala. 2004) (holding that federal common law applies to admiralty
choice-of-law decisions and that federal common law mirrors the Second Restate-
ment); Nat'l Fair HotIs. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp.
2d 46, 62 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting that federal common law follows the Second
Restatement approach for conflicts issues); Hamilton v. Cunningham, 880 F.
Supp. 1407, 1413 (D. Colo. 1995) (finding that federal common law follows the
Second Restatement regarding conflicts issues). But see Barkanic v. Gen. Admin.
of Civil Aviation of the P.R.C., 923 F.2d 957, 959-60 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying the
forum state's choice-of-law approach in a Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
case).
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to proceed to steps two and three. Without any specific refer-
ence in the black letter sections of the Second Restatement, or
in its comments to the more expansive view of false conflicts
espoused by Currie, federal courts would be on safe ground ap-
plying only the more traditional notion of false conflicts and de-
termining simply whether the pertinent choice-of-law
approaches conflict and whether the underlying substantive law
that could apply also conflict. This is exactly what the Third Cir-
cuit and the district court in the District of Columbia recently
did when addressing the issue of determining which jurisdic-
tion's choice-of-law approach to apply when the government's
negligence occurs in more than one jurisdiction, 157 though it is
doubtful whether either court gave any thought to how defining
the notion of false conflict would have changed their analyses.
Having made the decision as to what constitutes a false con-
flict, the court must proceed to determine whether there is a
false conflict as to the choice-of-law approaches or the underly-
ing substantive law. A hypothetical will demonstrate how this
analysis progresses. We return to our luckless (but wealthy) di-
vorcee with adult children, now taking off in instrument meteor-
ological conditions from an airport in Ohio after receiving an
incomplete weather briefing from a flight service station there.
During his flight in Ohio and Indiana airspace, the air traffic
controllers in both states fail to provide him with critical pilot
reports of icing conditions. He encounters problems with the
maneuverability of his aircraft, declares an emergency, and tries
to land at an uncontrolled airport just across the state line in
Kentucky. Because of icing on his aircraft and improper vectors
provided to him by controllers in Indiana, the plane crashes and
the pilot dies. Unknown to the pilot, his de-icing equipment
was malfunctioning, even though he had just had the equip-
ment serviced by a company in Ohio, just across the state line
from his home in Pennsylvania. The estate of the pilot sues the
United States and the company that serviced the de-icing equip-
ment in federal court in Ohio, venue being proper as to both
parties there.158 Plaintiff alleges that the United States was neg-
157 Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193, 200-02 (3d Cir. 2003); Gould Elecs.,
Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 179-81 (3d Cir. 2000); Raflo v. United States,
157 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2001) (applying the more traditional view of false
conflicts after applying the District of Columbia's expansive concept of false con-
flicts to the claims against the private defendant earlier in its analysis).
158 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000) (maintaining that venue is proper in a diversity
action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred); 28
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ligent for failing to provide adequate weather information in its
initial weather briefing in Ohio, in its failure to provide pilot
reports of icing in Ohio and Indiana, and in its provision of im-
proper vectors in Indiana.
The court must decide whether a false conflict exists as to the
relevant choice-of-law approaches applicable to the United
States and as to the potentially applicable substantive law. There
is a true conflict between the choice-of-law approach of Ohio
(where one portion of the government's negligence allegedly
occurred) and Indiana (where the remainder of the govern-
ment's negligence occurred). Ohio follows the Second Restate-
ment on choice-of-law issues in tort cases, 5 9 whereas Indiana has
rejected the Second Restatement'" and applies either a modi-
fied lex loci delicti approach' or a most significant contacts ap-
proach, depending on the importance of the place where the
injury occurred. 6 2 Although theoretically a court could apply
these two different choice-of-law approaches at this stage of the
analysis to determine if a different outcome would result under
either approach, courts addressing these issues usually have
been satisfied that there is a true conflict as to choice-of-law
rules when different methodologies would apply.'63 If the ap-
proaches truly would lead to the same result, then a court's deci-
sion to proceed through the remaining steps of this analysis
should not change the ultimate result in the case.
U.S.C. § 1402(b) (2000) (noting that venue is proper in the United States where
the plaintiff resides or where the act or omission occurred).
159 Power-Tek Solutions Servs., L.L.C. v. Techlink, Inc., 403 F.3d 353, 357 (6th
Cir. 2005) (applying Ohio choice-of-law rules); Symeonides, The American Choice-
of Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 91-92.
'6 Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 804 (Ind. 2004) (noting that the
court could have adopted the Second Restatement in 1987 when it modified its
previous adherence to the traditional rule but that it seemed likejjust as unattrac-
tive a course then as now).
11'1 Judge v. Pilot Oil Corp., 205 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying Indi-
ana's choice-of-law approach).
'62 Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 804-07; Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d
1071, 1073-74 (Ind. 1987).
IWI Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193, 200-02 (3d Cir. 2003); Gould Elecs.,
Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2000); Bowen v. United States,
570 F.2d 1311, 1317-18 (7th Cir. 1978); Rafto v. United States, 157 F. Stipp. 2d 1,
8 (D.D.C. 2001). But see In re Silver Bridge Disaster Litig., 381 F. Stipp. 931, 944-
46 (S.D. W. Va. 1974) (applying different choice-of-law approaches to show that
they nevertheless would lead to the application of the same substantive law on a
particular set of issues); Kantlehner v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 122, 125-28
(E.D.N.Y. 1967) (finding that the end result would be the same on a particular
issue under the various choice-of-law approaches).
4972006]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Based on these two choice-of-law approaches, several states'
substantive law could apply: Kentucky (where the crash oc-
curred), Indiana (where part of the government's negligence
occurred), Ohio (where the remaining government negligence
occurred and where the private defendant's negligence oc-
curred), and Pennsylvania (where the pilot lived). As to the po-
tentially applicable substantive law, the laws of Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky conflict on a number of critical
issues. For example, Kentucky law applies a pure comparative
fault system, allowing a plaintiff to recover regardless of the de-
gree of negligence attributable to the plaintiff,16 4 whereas Indi-
ana, 6 5 Ohio, 16 6 and Pennsylvania I 67 all apply a modified
comparative fault system in which a plaintiff will not recover if
his negligence is greater than the combined total of all defend-
ants' negligence. Also, Indiana law makes defendants severally
liable, 6 ' as does Kentucky, I6 9 whereas Pennsylvania holds de-
fendants jointly and severally liable, 170 and Ohio applies differ-
ent rules regarding when and for what type of damages joint
tortfeasors are severally liable and jointly and severally liable. 171
164 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (LexisNexis 2006); United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Preston, 26 S.W.3d 145, 146 (Ky. 2000).
165 IND. CODE. §§ 34-51-2-5, 34-51-2-6, 34-51-2-7 (1999).
166 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.33 (West 2004).
167 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (West 2002); Elder v. Orluck, 515 A.2d 517,
517-18, 525 (Pa. 1986).
168 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-51-2-8, 34-51-2-9 (LexisNexisl999); Control Techs.,
Inc. v. Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ind. 2002) (noting that under the Indiana
comparative fault scheme liability is apportioned among those persons whose
fault caused or contributed to causing the loss in proportion to their percentages
of fault).
169 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(1) (LexisNexis 2003); Degener v. Hall Contr.
Corp., 27 S.W.3d 775, 779 (Ky. 2000).
170 Baker v. AC&S, Inc., 729 A.2d 1140, 1146-47 (Pa. Super. 1999). In 2002,
the Pennsylvania legislature enacted tort reform that ensured defendants would
be severally liable only, except in cases of intentional misrepresentation, inten-
tional torts, or where a defendant is 60% or more at fault. 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7102 (West 2002). But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently affirmed
a Commonwealth Court's decision that had struck down this law as unconstitu-
tional and void. DeWeese v. Cortes, 906 A.2d 1193 (Pa. 2006). Efforts to re-enact
the legislation in a constitutional manner have suffered at the hand of the gover-
nor's veto. See Senator Corman's Statement on Governor Rendell's Veto of 'Fair
Share Act,' available at http://www.politicalspa.com/pressreleasedetail.asp?id=
2067 (visited Oct. 6, 2006). Consequently, Pennsylvania has reverted back to the
doctrine of joint and several liability, at least for now.
171 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.22, 2307.23, 2307.36 (Baldwin 2004). If one
defendant is greater than 50% at fault, then that defendant is jointly and severally
liable for economic losses and severally liable for non-economic losses. OHIO
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Additionally, as you may recall, our hapless pilot would not re-
ceive any damages for pain and suffering under Indiana law,' 72
nor would his estate receive any damages for his economic
losses. 7 ' In contrast, the pilot's estate and his beneficiaries
would be eligible to recover for the decedent's pain and suffer-
ing under Kentucky, Ohio, and Pennsylvania law, 74 as well as
for varying degrees of economic losses. 75 As a result, under the
facts of this hypothetical, the court would need to perform steps
two and three of the analysis to determine which state's choice-
of-law approach to apply and what substantive law will ultimately
apply to the United States after an application of those rules.
2. Selecting Between the States' Choice-of-Law Approaches
Courts have applied at least seven different approaches
throughout the years when struggling with the issue of how to
select which choice-of-law approach to apply when the govern-
ment's alleged negligence occurred in more than one jurisdic-
tion. The acts and omissions a court considers must be those
that are alleged to be actionable, rather than those that are ulti-
mately determined to be actionable,"'17 otherwise a court could not
make a choice-of-law decision in such cases until the fact finder
had rendered a decision on the merits. 17  The various ap-
proaches, their merits, and their shortcomings are set forth be-
low, along with their application to the facts of our hypothetical.
a. Applying the Statutory Language Literally
The FTCA provides that the law applicable to claims against
the United States is to be determined by the "law of the place
REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.22. [For those defendants that or less at fault, then they
are severally liable as to all damages. Id.].
172 IND. CODE § 34-9-3-4 (2000); Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 714 N.E.2d 702,
705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
173 IND. CODE § 34-23-1-2 (2000).
174 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 411, 133 (West 2003); Laverick v. Children's Hosp.
Med. Ctr., 540 N.E.2d 305, 308 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Estate of Coleman, 772
A.2d 1026, 1027 (Pa. Super. 2001).
175 Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (West 2004); Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d
318, 322 (Ky. 1997); Estate of Coleman, 772 A.2d at 1027.
176 Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1318 (7th Cir. 1978).
177 S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 1227, 1228-29 (E.D. Cal.
1978) (noting that when governmental acts or omissions occurred in more than
one jurisdiction, the court could not decide until after the close of plaintiff's
case-in-chief which of the relevant jurisdictions' choice-of-law approaches to ap-
ply). The problem with this delay should be self-evident.
4992006]
500 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
where the act or omission occurred." '78 When acts or omissions
have occurred in more than one jurisdiction, one court has ap-
plied the language literally. t7 9 In Kohn v. United States,18 0 the
family of a serviceman sued the United States for emotional dis-
tress following the Army's performance of an unauthorized au-
topsy, failure to return certain 'organs removed during the
autopsy, embalming of the body, and the cremation of certain
organs, all of which were in violation of the family's deeply held
religious beliefs.'8 1 Because these acts and omissions occurred
in both New York and Kentucky, the court decided to apply New
York's choice-of-law approach to the acts or omissions that oc-
curred there and Kentucky's choice-of-law approach to the acts
or omissions which occurred in that state. 82 This literal ap-
17, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000).
179 Other courts have looked at each act or omission separately but found it
unnecessary to decide which jurisdiction's choice-of-law rules to apply because
they all resulted in the application of the same state's substantive law. See Spring
v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 575, 575-77 (E.D. Va. 1993) (finding it unnecessary
to choose between the choice-of-law approaches of the two states where acts or
omissions occurred because they both applied the same approach and thus led to
the application of the same substantive law); Springer v. United States, 641 F.
Supp. 913, 934-35 (D.S.C. 1986) (negligent acts in Maryland and North Carolina
would lead to the application of the same substantive law because both states
apply the same choice-of-law rules); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 527 F.
Supp. 962, 966-67 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (unnecessary to choose between Arkansas and
Tennessee where acts and omissions occurred because both states' choice-of-law
rules would apply Tennessee substantive law); In re Silver Bridge Disaster Litig.,
381 F. Supp. 931, 944-46.(S.D. W. Va. 1974) (refraining from deciding among the
three jurisdictions where acts or omissions occurred because the choice-of-law
rules of the District of Columbia, Ohio, and West Virginia would lead to the
application of the same substantive law); Kantlehner v. United States, 279 F.
Supp. 122, 124-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (finding that although the nine jurisdictions'
choice-of-law rules conflicted and the potentially applicable substantive law con-
flicted on some issues, there was no conflict regarding the particular issue before
the court). Interestingly, in Insurance Company of North America, the court did not
consider the choice-of-law rules of Missouri, where other government acts or
omissions occurred because superseding acts had occurred elsewhere and
neither party had urged the application of thatjurisdiction's substantive law. Ins.
Co. of N. Am., 527 F. Supp. at 966 n.3. Discounting the substantive law of ajuris-
diction with contacts to an action seems appropriate when the parties do not
urge its application; however, not considering the choice-of-law rules from that ju-
risdiction simply because the parties did not urge the application of its substantive
law seems dubious, unless the acts or omissions that occurred later actually inter-
vened and superseded the earlier acts in Missouri so as to cut off the causal chain.
If the court simply discounted the earlier acts in one jurisdiction because later
ones occurred in another jurisdiction, then this action would be improper.
180 591 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
181 Id. at 571.
182 Id. at 572.
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proach worked in the Kohn case because each separate act was a
distinct tort and a fact finder could attribute different amounts
of damages to each separate act causing emotional distress,
thereby allowing the different claims to be analyzed under dif-
ferent choice-of-law approaches and potentially different sub-
stantive law. Such a literal approach does not work in wrongful
death or personal injury cases that typically arise from airplane
crashes because separate acts of negligence combine to cause a
single, indivisible harm-death or physical injury.'
Counsel should be aware that the Ninth Circuit has also
flirted with this approach in a wrongful death action. In Grunnet
v. United States, '4 the mother of a member of Jim Jones' cult
sued the United States for failing to prevent the death of her
daughter by suicide or other violent means in Jonestown,
Guyana.15 The alleged acts or omissions occurred in both
Guyana and the United States.l"" Instead of searching for the
one place where the acts or omissions occurred, the Ninth Cir-
cuit considered the acts in the United States and the acts in the
foreign country separately. 8 7 After finding that the omissions
that occurred in Guyana were barred by the FTCA's foreign
country exception,' the Ninth Circuit looked to the other acts
or omissions that occurred in the United States.' The court
found that the cloak of the discretionary function exception cov-
ered most of these acts or omissions, while the remaining acts or
omissions occurred exclusively in California." As a result, the
court did not have to confront the issue of how to apply two or
183 Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2000) (dis-
cussing the limitations of the literal language approach); see also Beattie v. United
States, 756 F.2d 91, 104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, Smith v.
United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (endorsing the fragmentation of a unitary
claim for choice-of-law purposes under the FTCA); Beattie, 756 F.2d at 130-42, 141
(Wald, J., concurring) (believing that courts should apply either the law of each
place where the separate acts occurred or "by some formula choose one place
such as the place where the most significant act or omission occurred"); id. at
106-30, 122 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that it was "inconceivable" that Con-
gress intended to apply different choice-of-law rules for each act or omission, and
proposing instead that the choice-of-law rules of the place where the "operative
non-compliance occurs - regardless of whether any specific 'blame' can be attrib-
uted to any particular federal employee at that point").
184 Grunnet v. United States, 730 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1984).
185 Id. at 574.
1- Id. at 574-76.
117 Id. at 575-76.
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more sets of choice-of-law rules to a single wrongful death ac-
tion. If the court had been faced with such an issue, would this
just be another example of our old French ami, depecage, at
work? It would not. With the application of different choice-of-
law approaches to the same wrongful death claim, there is the
potential for different substantive law to apply to the same issue
as to the same defendant so that the United States could be jointly
and severally liable according to the laws of one jurisdiction and
severally liable according to the laws of another. Choice-of-law
issues are complex enough without introducing unnecessary, in-
tractable problems. 9 '
This approach is unworkable in the context of our hypotheti-
cal because it involves a single, indivisible injury.
b. Place of the Last Act or Omission Having Causal Effect
A more workable solution to the problem of how to choose
the pertinent choice-of-law rules involves the application of the
rules of the place where the last act or omission having causal
effect occurred. 9 2 In Bowen v. United States,193 a pilot brought an
FTCA action based on the alleged failure of air traffic control-
lers in a number of states to warn him of icing conditions during
a flight from Texas to Indiana that ultimately resulted in his air-
craft crashing as he attempted to land in Indiana.'94 Con-
fronted with multiple government acts or omissions occurring
in differentjurisdictions, the Seventh Circuit found that the text
of the FTCA supported only two possibilities, that of the place
where the "last act or omission" occurred or the place where the
acts with "the most significant causal effect" occurred. 95 The
first approach is considered here, the latter in the next section.
The "last act or omission" test has the distinct advantage of
certainty, a greatly underrated word in the choice-of-law lexicon.
Even in the early stages of litigation before any depositions have
been taken, when decisions regarding what law will apply in the
191 Perhaps Grunnet can be limited to its facts so that Ninth Circuit courts will
consider acts and omissions separately only when some of those acts or omissions
occurred in a foreign country, thus triggering the application of the foreign
country exception to the claims of negligence based on acts or omissions occur-
ring there. For the cases involving acts or omissions exclusively in this country,
courts in the Ninth Circuit should follow Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504 (9th
Cir. 1983).
192 See Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
193 Id.
,94 Id. at 1313.
",5 Id. at 1318.
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case usually should be made, both counsel and the court should
be able to determine where the last act of governmental negli-
gence occurred. Application of the test to our hypothetical
demonstrates its appeal. Although the estate of the deceased
pilot alleged the government was negligent in Ohio and Indi-
ana, the last acts with any causal effect clearly were the improper
vectors that the Indiana controllers provided to the pilot after
he declared an emergency. This approach would lead to the
application of Indiana's choice-of-law rules in our hypothetical.
The problem with the test is that the last act with any causative
effect may not be the most significant act or even one of any
significance, resulting in the arbitrary application of one juris-
diction's choice-of-law rules, even though that jurisdiction may
have little relation to the entire litigation."
c. Place of the Act or Omission Having the Most Significant
Causal Effect
The Seventh Circuit in Bowen found that selecting the choice-
of-law rules of "the place of the act or omission having the most
significant causal effect. . seems to us to be more consistent with
the statutory language and Congress' intent."'" 7 Although this
test is less arbitrary than the other approach considered by the
Seventh Circuit because it focuses on the acts or omissions that
are most important to the litigation, its strength is also its weal-
ness. If a party requests that a court decide the choice-of-law
issue early in the litigation to avoid committing resources to de-
velop facts that might be ultimately irrelevant depending on
which jurisdiction's law applies, then how is a court to decide
which acts or omissions will ultimately be those found to have
the most significant causal effect? Courts that rely exclusively on
the allegations set forth in the plaintiffs complaint will be re-
duced to counting the number of allegations in each jurisdic-
tion without the benefit of knowing the significance of any of
Shapiro, supra note 103, at 672 ("The simplicity of the 'last negligent cause'
analysis, however, is countermanded by the possibility that the last negligent act
or omission is an insubstantial cause of the injury, at least relative to other
causes.") (citing Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354 (D.D.C. 1981)).
197 Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1318. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit found it unnec-
essary to decide between the two proposed approaches because they both led to
the application of Indiana's choice-of-law rules under the facts of the case. Id.
Similarly, the Eastern District of Virginia found it unnecessary to decide between
the two approaches outlined in Bowen because they both led to the application of
the same substantive law. Spring v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 575, 577 (E.D. Va.
1993).
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these acts or omissions. Clever (and prescient) plaintiffs coun-
sel can always increase the number of specific allegations in one
jurisdiction over another to tip the scale in favor of the jurisdic-
tion with the more favorable choice-of-law approach. To avoid a
decision in favor of one jurisdiction over another based merely
on numerical advantage, the parties will have to conduct discov-
ery-including probably expert depositions-before an accu-
rate choice-of-law decision can be made regarding the acts or
omissions with the most significant causal effect, a result that
increases litigation costs and diminishes the likelihood of an
early settlement.' Indeed, even after expert depositions have
been taken, the parties may still not agree on (and the court
may not be able to determine) which acts have the most signifi-
cant causal effect.'99 By the time expert reports and depositions
have been taken, counsel may be in the uncomfortable position
of having to highlight some acts as most important for liability
issues and other acts as most important for purposes of choice-
of-law determinations.2 0 0
Applying this test to the facts of the hypothetical is not easy.
We need much more information to be certain whether the acts
and omissions in Ohio or in Indiana had the most significant
causal effect. Nevertheless, if Ohio's choice-of-law approach was
more favorable to the plaintiff, then the estate of the pilot could
argue that the omissions in Ohio had the most significant causal
effect because the pilot would never have taken off had he re-
ceived a full weather briefing. In contrast, if Indiana's choice-of-
law approach favored the government, the United States could
argue that "[t]he relative importance of the Indiana events be-
comes apparent when it is recalled that flight control personnel
198 See Shapiro, supra note 103, at 672 (observing that the most significant
causal approach is "often difficult to apply in practice" and that "It]his is espe-
cially true in the early stages of litigation, when factual questions such as signifi-
cant causation have yet to be resolved, but when courts often need to decide the
applicable law for purposes of motions").
199 Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193, 196, 203 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that
"this case was fully ready for a four-week trial when the District Court" decided
the choice-of-law issues, and yet the Third Circuit, even after the experts were
deposed and the pre-trial briefs had been filed, still found that "reasonable minds
could disagree on which cause (if any) was most significant").
200 Compare Schalliol v. Fare, 206 F. Supp. 2d 689, 692 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(finding that the "parties' pretrial memoranda clearly emphasize the conduct of
the Indiana controllers over the publications" in the District of Columbia), with
Simon, 341 F.3d at 203 (noting that the plaintiffs in the same case were arguing
that "producing a defective product" in the District of Columbia constituted the
"major sin of commission" for purposes of the choice-of-law determination).
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in that state were responsible for giving [the pilot] the informa-
tion he would need to complete his journey .... ,,211 At the very
least, because controllers in both Ohio and Indiana failed to
provide pertinent pilot reports of icing, the events in Ohio "had
no more causal significance than those [events] that occurred in
Indiana .... On balance, this approach seems to favor Indi-
ana over Ohio.
d. The Place Where a Physical Act Necessary to Avoid
Negligence Should Have Occurred
The Ninth Circuit chooses which jurisdiction's choice-of-law
rules to apply when government acts or omissions occurred in
more than one jurisdiction by applying the law of the place
where "physical acts" could have prevented the injury2t) In Du-
cey v. United States,20 4 three persons were killed by a flash flood in
a recreation area, allegedly because the park service failed to
close the facility or to post signs.Y115 Although the court recog-
nized that park service decisions in California informed the acts
and omissions of park service employees in Nevada, the court
found that the "failure to close down the facility" and the "fail-
tire to post signs" were omissions that "could have been pre-
vented only by the doing of such physical acts as the posting of
signs, the erection of barbed wire, and the tearing up of boat
slips and trailer spaces in Nevada. 2 '  The Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach to this problem was therefore to apply the choice-of-law
rules of the jurisdiction where "physical acts" could have pre-
vented the injury.1 7
The Ninth Circuit's method is a most unsatisfactory approach
because its utility (if it has any at all) seems limited to cases in-
volving policy decisions and a chain of sequential and depen-
21 Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1318.
202 Id.
203 See Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 509 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983).
204 Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1983).
2W- Id. at 507, 509 n.2.
206 Id.
20, See id.; see also Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. United States, 507 U.S.
197 (1993) (proposing a somewhat similar rule to that of the Ninth Circuit by
applying the choice-of-law approach of the place where the "operative non-com-
pliance occurs - regardless of whether any specific 'blame' can be attributed to
any particular federal employee at that point"). Applying then-Judge Scalia's ap-
proach to the facts of Ducey leads to the same result that the Ninth Circuit
reached.
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dent causality, where the latter omissions were based, at least in
part, on acts or omissions taken elsewhere. In our hypothetical,
physical acts in both Ohio and Indiana could have prevented
the accident because all of the acts were independently opera-
tive negligent acts or omissions. For example, the plaintiff
could allege that if only the flight service station employee in
Ohio had spoken (instead of failing to speak) about the icing
conditions, the pilot never would have taken off. If only the
controller in Ohio had provided timely and pertinent pilot re-
ports, the pilot would have aborted his flight and landed short
of his destination. If only the controller in Indiana had done
likewise, his life would have been spared. If only the controller
in Indiana had given proper vectors, the pilot could have landed
the aircraft before the icing caused the aircraft to fall from the
sky. The Ninth Circuit's approach set forth in Ducey provides no
answer for our hypothetical facts.
e. Place Where the Relevant Act or Omission Occurred
In Hitchcock v. United States,208 the District of Columbia Circuit
followed an approach that selects the choice-of-law rules based
on where the "relevant act or omission" occurred.2 °9 In that
case, a nurse in Virginia administered a vaccine, the protocol for
which was developed by officials in the District of Columbia. 210
The court applied the District of Columbia's choice-of-law rules
rather than those of Virginia, because it was the development of
the protocol for giving the vaccine that was "relevant" rather
than its actual administration in Virginia. 1 Indeed, the court
recognized that "[a]ny negligence arising from these facts cer-
tainly cannot be attributed to the nurse. '21 2 The choice was
clear in Hitchcock, but trying to apply the Hitchcock approach to
the facts of our hypothetical demonstrates its limitations. The
approach only works when the case involves a choice between
dependent acts occurring in more than one jurisdiction. The
air traffic controllers in the hypothetical engaged in indepen-
208 Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
20) Id. at 359.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. This is the opposite result from that which would occur under then-
Judge Scalia's proposed approach in his dissent in Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d
91 (D.C. Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197
(1993). According to his approach, the applicable choice-of-law rules would be
those of the place where the nurse administered the vaccine.
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dent negligent acts and omissions that combined to cause the
aircraft to crash and thus are not the aeronautical equivalent of
the staff nurse properly administering policies negligently devel-
oped elsewhere .2 " As a result, this approach is inapplicable to
our hypothetical.
f. Place Where Most Substantial Portion of Acts or Omissions
Occurred
The District of Columbia is also the source of another ap-
proach in which the court applied the choice-of-law rules of the
place where the most substantial portion of the acts or omissions
occurred. In Raflo v. United States,2 4 a governmental and non-
governmental defendant allegedly failed to diagnose and treat
the medical condition of the plaintiffs wife.' 15 Numerous gov-
ernment acts or omissions occurred in both Virginia and the
District of Columbia, although more occurred in Virginia.21 "
While the district court acknowledged that, as mandatory prece-
dent, Hitchcock "clearly controls the analysis in this Court,2 1 7 the
district court was still unable to apply that approach because
Hitchcock failed to give "clear guidance ... regarding the proper
standard to follow when relevant acts or omissions occur in
more than one jurisdiction .... ,,2 " The problem implicit in the
district court's conundrum was that not all of the acts or omis-
sions in one jurisdiction were dependent on acts or omissions in
the other jurisdiction. If the acts or omissions in one jurisdic-
tion were dependent on the acts or omissions in another juris-
diction, then there would be only one jurisdiction with
"relevant" acts or omissions, regardless of the number of acts or
omissions involved. Facing an issue not present in Hitchcock, the
Raflo court decided that it would be "prudent to elect the choice
of law provision belonging to the place where the most substan-
tial portion of the acts or omissions occurred. ' '2" ' Applying the
choice-of-law approach of the place where the most negligent
acts or omissions occurred certainly has the advantage of sim-
.1" See Schalliol v. Fare, 206 F. Supp. 2d 689, 697-98 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (noting
that this approach was "indeterminate" when "two independent actors [are] each
alleged to be negligent in their own right").
214 Raflo v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001).
215 id. at 4.
216 Id. at 9-10.
217 Id. at 9.
218 Id. at 10.
219 Id.
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plicity and would probably lead to the proper result in most
cases; however, this approach is open to abuse by a skillful
pleader or expert who can turn a single event into a series of
alleged acts or omissions sufficient to tip the scale in favor of a
jurisdiction with a more favorable choice-of-law approach.
The limitations of this approach are evident when it is applied
to the facts of our hypothetical. In Ohio, the flight service sta-
tion failed to inform the pilot of the icing conditions and con-
trollers in that state also failed to pass along pertinent pilot
reports of icing. In Indiana, the controller failed to pass along
other pertinent pilot reports and provided improper vectors.
Therefore, two acts and omissions occurred in both jurisdic-
tions. Without more detailed information regarding these alle-
gations, perhaps arising from an expert deposition, it would be
impossible for a court to determine the pertinent choice-of-law
rules. As a result, this approach is indeterminate when applied
to our hypothetical.
g. Place Where the Last Significant Act or Omission
Occurred
The Third Circuit has recently articulated a new test that ap-
plies the choice-of-law rules of the jurisdiction where the last sig-
nificant act or omission occurred when government negligence
occurs in more than one jurisdiction. In Simon v. United States,22°
an aircraft crashed in Kentucky, allegedly resulting from the
negligence of controllers in Indiana who cleared the pilot for an
approach whose navigational aid had been inoperative for years
and from allegedly negligent policymaking occurring in the Dis-
trict of Columbia that had allowed the instrument approach
procedure to continue to be published all those years while the
navigational aid was not working.221 The Third Circuit recog-
nized that the acts and omissions of the controllers in Indiana
were independent of the allegedly defective instrument ap-
proach procedure.222 Declining to follow a previous panel deci-
sion of the Third Circuit that had considered five approaches
from other courts without choosing one single approach,223 the
220 Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2003).
22! See id. at 194, 203.
222 See id. at 203.
223 Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 183 (3d Cir. 2003) (declin-
ing to choose which approach to apply because all workable approaches led to
the application of the same state's choice-of-law rules). For some reason, the
Third Circuit in Simon thought that the five approaches articulated in Gould Elec-
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court in Simon chose to articulate a new "last significant act or
omission" approach because "clarity is the most important virtue
in crafting a rule by which we choose" the correct jurisdiction's
choice-of-law rules.
2 2 4
This test enjoys the certainty of the "last act or omission hav-
ing causal effect" approach without saddling itself with that ap-
proach's potential for arbitrary results that can occur when the
last act is only incidental to the accident; similarly, the test takes
the positive aspects of the "most significant causal effect" ap-
proach that ensures that the jurisdiction whose choice-of-law
rules are chosen will be significantly related to the government's
negligence, while "avoiding the conjecture that 'most significant
act' inquiries often entail. 225 Although courts may struggle with
what constitutes "a significant act," the burden is much less on
both the parties and the court compared with trying to deter-
mine the place where the most significant act occurred. The
strengths of this approach were recently recognized by Justice
Ginsburg in a concurrence in the context of the FTCA's "for-
eign country" exception,"' and her endorsement of the ap-
proach bodes well for its adoption by other courts in the context
of choosing which choice-of-law rules to apply when government
negligence occurs in more than one jurisdiction. Applying this
approach to the facts of our hypothetical points to the applica-
tion of Indiana's choice-of-law rules because the last government
acts and omissions occurred there, and these acts and omissions
were "significant" in that the plaintiff alleged the controller's
failure to provide proper vectors so delayed the aircraft's ap-
proach that it ensured the aircraft crashed rather than landed
safely.
h. My Two Cents
After reviewing numerous approaches articulated by various
courts, it is clear that any given case should fit into one of three
tronics, Inc. were combined into some sort of test that failed to provide "any gui-
dance as to which approach should be given the most weight." Simon, 341 F.3d at
204. There is no basis for such a conclusion. The Gould court simply considered
five possible approaches, determining that one was unworkable and the remain-
ing four all pointed to the same state's choice-of-law rules, precluding any need
to choose one approach over another. See Gould Elecs,., Inc., 220 F.2d at 183.
"4 Simon, 341 F.3d at 204.
225 Id.
21i Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 755-61 (2004) (Ginsburg & Breyer,
.1., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Symeonides, 2004 An-
nual Survey, supra note 7, at 925-30 (discussing the Sosa case).
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categories. First, there are cases that do not involve a single,
indivisible injury. In those cases, it would seem unnecessary to
choose a singular act or omission because applying the choice-
of-law rules for each act or omission works well. Second, there
are cases that involve acts or omissions in which the latter acts
are wholly dependent on the acts or omissions that occurred
earlier. In those cases, usually involving a government employee
simply following instructions or a protocol developed elsewhere,
the choice-of-law rules of the place where the instructions or
protocol was developed should apply. In all other cases, where
the latter acts or omissions are only partially dependent on ear-
lier acts or omissions, or where all acts or omissions are indepen-
dent of each other, the best approach is that articulated recently
by the Third Circuit applying the choice-of-law rules of the place
where the last significant act or omission occurred.
3. Applying the Chosen Jurisdiction's Choice-ofLaw Approach
Applying these approaches to the facts of the hypothetical
demonstrates that one approach was unworkable, three were in-
determinate, and three pointed to the application of Indiana's
choice-of-law rules. Applying Indiana's choice-of-law approach
to the facts of our hypothetical also leads to the application of
Indiana's substantive law to all aspects of the claims against the
United States. Indiana applies a two-step choice-of-law ap-
proach, beginning with the presumption that the traditional lex
loci delicti will apply, a presumption that "is not conclusive" and
can be "overcome if the court is persuaded that the 'place of the
tort "bears little connection" to this legal action.'"2 2 7 In our hy-
pothetical, the place of the tort is Kentucky because that is the
place where the death occurred, the "last event necessary to
make the United States liable[.] '' 22" Although "[i]n a large
number of cases, the place of the tort will be significant and the
place with the most contacts, ' 229 this is not true in our hypotheti-
cal because Kentucky's only connection with the action is that
the death occurred there. Under Indiana's choice-of-law ap-
proach, this means that Kentucky bears little connection to the
action, so that the presumption in favor of the lex loci delicti is
overcome.
230
227 Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Hubbard
Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind. 1987)).
228 Id.
229 Hubbard Mfg. Co., 515 N.E.2d at 1073.
230 See Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 806.
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Under the second step of the approach, the court considers
factors that might be relevant to determining which jurisdiction
has the most significant relationship or contacts to the case,
such as the place or places where the conduct causing the injury
occurred, the residence or place of business of the parties, and
the place where the relationship is centered.2 1' Although these
factors are to be considered "according to their relative impor-
tance to the litigation at hand, ' 23 2 Indiana applies a claim-by-
claim approach, rather than an issue-by-issue approach, and es-
chews consideration of state interests or policies.3 ' This means
that Indiana will choose only one state's substantive law to apply
to the entire wrongful death claim-liability, apportionment of
fault, and compensatory damages": 4 -based on an examination
of at least these three factors. 215 Even though government acts
and omissions occurred in both Indiana and Ohio,36 the "con-
duct" factor points to the application of Indiana substantive law
because the "conduct in Indiana was more proximate to the
harm" and more directly affected the aircraft and its attempts to
land.23 7 The conduct in Indiana was thus more important.
Under Indiana's approach to wrongful death cases, "[t]he resi-
dence or place of business of a party . . . is not a particularly
231 1d.; Hubbard Mfg. Co., 515 N.E.2d at 1073-74.
232 Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 806.
233 See id. at 801-04.
234 See id. at 806-07; Hubbard Mfg. Co., 515 N.E.2d at 1074; see aLso Judge v. Pilot
Oil Corp., 205 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2000);Judge v. Pilot Oil Corp., 17 F. Supp.
2d 832, 835-36 (N.D. Ind. 1998). As a result, Indiana's choice-of-law analysis and
its results can be at odds with other modern choice-of-law approaches such as
that of the Second Restatement.
2!5 Only one Indiana court appears to have considered factors other than the
three first enunciated in Hubbard Manufiacturing Co. See In re Estate of Bruck, 632
N.E.2d 745, 747-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
236 Under this choice-of-law analysis, it is the government's conduct that is at
issue, not that of the plaintiff or the co-defendant, the company that negligently
repaired the de-icing equipment. See Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 807 ("[I]t is the con-
duct of the FAA and the air traffic controllers that is at issue, not the conduct of
the plaintiffs."); Hubbard Mfg. Co., 515 N.E.2d at 1074 (dismissing as irrelevant
contacts unrelated to the action against the defendant).
237 Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 807. When an injury is caused by conduct in more
than one jurisdiction, Indiana courts have found that the conduct factor favors
the state where the most significant conduct occurred. See Ram Prods. Co. v.
Chauncey, 967 F. Supp. 1071, 1081 (N.D. Ind. 1997); Hoffman v. Roberto, 578
N.E.2d 701, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). If the hypothetical facts ultimately showed
that the controller's communications with the pilot during the latter's attempt to
land constituted the most significant of all the government conduct, then this
would be another reason why this factor would favor Indiana.
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relevant contact, ''2 8 so the court will not give much weight to
the plaintiffs residence in Pennsylvania, the co-defendant's resi-
dence in Ohio, the government's places of business in both
Ohio and Indiana,239 or its residence in neither or both states.2 4 °
Finally, when "the contact between the allegedly negligent party
and the injured party is fleeting," as is often the case between
pilots and controllers, Indiana will not consider this sufficient
enough to constitute a "relationship," so there can be no place
where this non-existent relationship is centered.241  Of these
three factors, Indiana considers "the most important relevant
factor" to be "where the conduct causing the injury occurred
because an individual's actions and the recovery available to
others as a result of those actions should be governed by the law
of the state in which he acts. ' 242 Although it is a close case, Indi-
238 Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 807; see also id. ("People do not take the laws of their
home state with them when they travel .... ");Judge v. Pilot Oil Corp., 205 F.3d
335, 337 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding a plaintiffs residency to be "irrelevant to the
outcome of this [wrongful death] case" because "the tragic events of this case
would still have transpired if [the decedents] had been from any other state in
the nation .... );Judge v. Pilot Oil Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 832, 835, 836 (N.D.
Ind. 1998) (noting that the decedent "having resided in [a particular state] does
not bear much on whether Defendants negligently caused his death in another
state" and rejecting plaintiffs' "suggestion that [the law of the decedent's domi-
cile] should apply here because of that state's interest in full compensation for its
residents under its own laws").
239 The government's place of business would be where its flight service station
was located and where its air traffic controllers were located. See Schalliol v. Fare,
206 F. Supp. 2d 689, 700 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
240 Compare Clawans v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 2d 368, 374 (D.N.J. 1999)
(maintaining that the United States is a resident of no particular state), with
United States v. Whitcomb, 314 F.2d 415, 417-18 (4th Cir. 1963) (finding that the
United States is a resident of every state).
241 Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 807 (refusing to recognize a relationship between con-
trollers and a pilot and his passengers). But see Zabala Clemente v. United States,
567 F.2d 1140, 1148 (1st Cir. 1977) (recognizing a relationship between air traffic
controllers and the pilot and passengers in an aircraft); Yates v. United States,
497 F.2d 878, 882-83 (10th Cir. 1974) (finding a pilot and controller relation-
ship); Carney v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 648, 651 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (recogniz-
ing a relationship between an air traffic controller in Mississippi and a pilot in
Alabama that was centered where the controller was located); Roland v. United
States, 463 F. Supp. 852, 854 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (finding a pilot and controller
relationship).
242 Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 806-07. The Indiana Supreme Court does not seem
unduly bothered by its analytical decision to substitute one controlling factor
(the place where the tort occurred) for another (the place where the conduct
occurred). Indeed, this emphasis on the conduct factor holds true even when
the pertinent conflicts between the potentially applicable substantive laws revolve
around apportionment of fault and compensatory damages. See id. at 806 ("The
gravamen of this case is the allegedly negligent conduct."); see also Simon v.
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ana's choice-of-law approach would probably apply its own sub-
stantive law to the entire FTCA claim filed against the United
States in our hypothetical.
C. WHEN ONE STATE'S LAw APPLIES TO THE UNITED STATES
AND ANOTHER STATE'S LAW APPLIES TO THE
PRIVATE CO-DEFENDANT
Both counsel for plaintiffs and counsel for defendants should
care what law applies to the claims against the United States in a
multi-party action because either of their clients could be left
holding the proverbial baby when it comes time to enter judg-
ment, as the plaintiff may recover less than expected.4 or the
co-defendant may have to pick up part of the tab for Uncle Sam.
Here are the preconditions that can allow this to happen.244
First, the choice-of-law rules applicable to the United States
must differ from those applicable to the co-defendant, as can
occur anytime the forum state is not the place where the govern-
ment's acts or omissions occurred. Second, the choice-of-law
rules applicable to the United States must require that one
state's substantive law applies regardless of any considerations of
uniformity of result or ease of administration, an outcome sure
to occur when applying the lex loci delicti approach and some
modern choice-of-law approaches such as that followed in Indi-
ana. Finally, the two sets of choice-of-law rules (one for the
United States and one for the co-defendant) must lead to the
application of different state laws that conflict, an outcome that
is increasingly likely as states continue to apply divergent choice-
of-law approaches and have disparate substantive law in the
wake of tort reform, especially on allocation of fault and com-
pensatory damages.
United States, 341 F.3d 193, 204, 205 (3d Cir. 2003) (certifying choice-of-law is-
sues to the Indiana Supreme Court, noting that "[t]his case is essentially about
damages, for liability does not seem difficult . . ." and setting forth the areas of
substantive law that were in conflict-apportionment of fault and compensatory
damages).
2'1 Of course, any time plaintiff's counsel mistakenly believes the choice-of-law
rules of the forum will automatically apply to claims against the United States,
counsel's recovery for the client may be different than anticipated. This can lead
to unexpectedly limited damages as set forth in the hypothetical in Section III.
The shortfalls discussed here in Section IV are those that can occur in multi-party
actions.
',14 Although there may be other paths to the same result, the three prerequi-
sites set forth in the text are those that are most likely to occur.
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These criteria are present under the facts of our hypothetical,
so that different state law would apply to the United States than
would apply to the claims against the co-defendant. As set forth
above, Indiana law applies to all issues against the United States.
In contrast, because the decedent resided in Pennsylvania, that
state's compensatory damages law would probably apply to the
claims against the co-defendant under Ohio's Second Restate-
ment approach. As a result, the United States would not have to
pay damages to the plaintiff under Indiana law24 5 for any of the
decedent's lost income because he was divorced with adult and
non-dependent children, whereas the co-defendant would have
to pay such damages in accordance with Pennsylvania law.246
Similarly, Indiana law precludes an award for the pain and suf-
fering of the decedent under the facts of our hypothetical so the
United States would not be required to pay any such award;2 47 in
contrast, Pennsylvania law allows such an award, so the co-defen-
dant would have to pay these damages in accordance with Penn-
sylvania law.248
The key question then becomes the "common issue" of appor-
tionment of fault. Given that the FTCA and Supreme Court pre-
cedent require the district court to select the choice-of-law
approach of the place where the acts or omissions occurred, and
the jurisdiction in our hypothetical selects the substantive law of
one state for the entire claim (just as the lex loci delicti approach
does), the court cannot then set aside such precedent and parse
the claims into distinct issues, common or otherwise, without ei-
ther grafting an exception onto the FTCA choice-of-law provi-
sion or by doing violence to the state's choice-of-law
approach.249 Thus, with Indiana law applying to all aspects of
245 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-23-1-2 (West 1999).
246 See Estate of Coleman, 772 A.2d 1026, 1027-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
247 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-9-3-4 (West 1999); Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 714
N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
248 Estate of Coleman, 772 A.2d at 1027 (stating that decedent's pain and suffer-
ing was compensable under Pennsylvania law).
249 The possibility that two different states' laws could apply to a common issue
such as apportionment of fault is much less likely to occur in aviation cases involv-
ing only private parties simply because the choice-of-law rules that would apply
are usually the same either in state court or in a diversity case in federal court.
Only a transfer of venue involving some but not all of the parties seems like it
could open the possibility for conflicting substantive law to apply on the issue of
apportionment of fault. Suppose claims are filed between several plaintiffs and
several defendants in one district court. The choice-of-law rules of that forum
apply under Supreme Court precedent. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487, 496 (1941). If another set of claims involving another set of plaintiffs
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the claims against the United States, the court must decide
whether to apply the law of Indiana, Ohio, or Pennsylvania on
the issue of apportionment of fault to the claims against the pri-
vate co-defendant. Although Indiana law follows the principles
of several liability, 50 Ohio and Pennsylvania apply different
rules. In Ohio, if one defendant is greater than 50% at fault,
then that defendant is jointly and severally liable for economic
losses and severally liable for non-economic losses2 5 For the
remaining defendants that are less than 50% at fault, they are
only severally liable for all damages.2 52 If all defendants are 50%
or less at fault, then all defendants are severally liable as to all
damages.253 In contrast, Pennsylvania law makes defendants
jointly and severally liable. 254 The court is faced with either ap-
plying Indiana's law on the issue of apportionment of fault so as
to achieve harmony and ease of application, or to apply the laws
of two different states on that common issue based on the com-
peting interests of the resident states of the pilot and the co-
defendant. If the court chooses the former approach, the plain-
tiff may obtain less than his expected damages; if the court
chooses the latter, the co-defendant may have to pay more than
its fair share.
The District of New Jersey has addressed this exact issue. In
Clawans v. United States,"25' an aircraft crash resulted in the
deaths of the pilot and two passengers.2 6 One passenger filed
suit against the United States and the pilot.2 57 The pilot filed a
third-party complaint against the owner of the aircraft and a
cross-claim against the United States.158 The United States filed
a cross-claim for contribution against the pilot, and the owner
filed cross-claims against the United States and the pilot for con-
and defendants are transferred from a different jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404, then potentially different choice-of-law rules would apply. See
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 244 n.8 (1981). If one of those sets of
choice-of-law rules did not take state interests or policies into account and did
not apply an issue-by-issue approach, then potentially different substantive law on
the issue of apportionment of fault could apply.
250 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-51-2-8, 34-51-2-9 (West 1998); Control Techs., Inc. v.
Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ind. 2002).
251 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.22 (West 2004).
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (West 2002); see also discussion at note 170.
255 Clawans v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 2d 368 (D.NJ. 1999).
256 Id. at 370-71.
257 Id. at 371.
258 Id.
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tribution.259 The second passenger sued the United States, the
pilot, and the owner of the aircraft.260 The pilot filed a cross-
claim for contribution against the United States and the air-
craft's owner in the second passenger's action. 261 The United
States filed a cross-claim for contribution against the pilot in the
second passenger's action, and the owner of the aircraft filed
cross-claims against all defendants. 262 Finally, the pilot filed a
lawsuit against the United States and the owner of the aircraft,
and the owner asserted cross-claims for contribution.263
The United States sought a determination of the applicable
law to all FTCA claims, including those against the United States
for contribution. 264 Although the court did not explain why it
was doing so, it analyzed the choice-of-law issues involving the
United States separately from those involving the private de-
fendants because different choice-of-law approaches applied to
those two sets of claims. 265 The court found that the choice-of-
law rules of Virginia applied to the claims against the United
States because the government's acts or omissions occurred
there, and New Jersey's choice-of-law approach applied to the
state-law claims against the private defendants as New Jersey was
the forum state. 266 Because Virginia's choice-of-law rules are lex
loci delicti, the court decided that all claims against the United
States-including claims for contribution-would be governed
by the law of Maryland.267 When the court turned its attention
specifically to the issue of apportionment of fault between all co-
defendants, the court noted that "all cross-claims for contribu-
tion asserted against the United States, i.e., those asserted by the
[pilot] and by [the owner], are governed by the FTCA .... No






264 Id. at 370.
265 Id. at 371-75.
266 Id. at 371, 372.
267 Id. at 372.
268 Id. at 374. There seems to be a typographical error in the opinion that
could confuse the reader. After the court noted that Maryland law applies to "all
cross-claims for contribution asserted against the United States [by the pilot and
the owner]," the court went on to state that the "issue to be decided is whether
the remaining cross-claims for contribution-against the United States by [the pi-
lot and the owner], and between [the pilot and the owner] -should be decided by
Maryland law or New Jersey law." Id. (emphasis added). The only way for this
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ther Maryland law or New Jersey law could apply to the appor-
tionment of fault issues in the non-FTCA claims.*2" ' The court
observed that, although both Maryland law and New Jersey law
adhere to the principles of joint and several liability, "Maryland
allocates fault on a pro rata basis, while New Jersey apportions
[fault] based on actual degree of fault.'2 7" After again noting
that "the cross-claims against the United States must be governed
by Maryland law under the FTCA,''2 71 the court chose Maryland
law to govern the issue of apportionment of fault, largely be-
cause this result comported with several of the policies enumer-
ated in section six of the Second Restatement, those involving
"certainty, predictability and uniformity of result," along with
''ease of determination and application of the law to be
applied."272
And now back to our hypothetical. If the court in our hypo-
thetical followed the District of New Jersey's lead, then Indiana
law would apply to all apportionment of fault issues, so the co-
defendant would have to pay the plaintiffs economic losses and
pain and suffering damages only in accordance with its percent-
age of fault. Because neither of these types of damages is recov-
erable from the government based on Indiana law, the plaintiff
would simply not recover the remaining economic and non-eco-
nomic losses. If the court allowed the state interests of Penn-
sylvania and Ohio to trump the policies of uniformity and ease
of application, then the co-defendant could pay more than its
share under either of those state's allocation of fault rules, de-
pending on how the court ultimately attributes fault. For exam-
ple, if the court applied Ohio law on apportionment of fault and
the private co-defendant was at least 50% responsible, it would
have to pay 100% of the economic losses, regardless of its own
degree of fault, though it would be severally liable for non-eco-
nomic damages such as pain and suffering. Alternatively, if the
court chose to apply Pennsylvania law to the issue of apportion-
ment of fault in the claims against the private co-defendant,
then the co-defendant would be jointly and severally liable for
text and the subsequent analysis to make sense is for the choice-of-law issue to
involve the contribution claims by the United States against the pilot and owner
and between the two private party defendants. Consequently, this is how the
practitioner should read this case.
2 9 Id. at 374-75.
27o Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
271 Id. (emphasis added).
272 Id. at 373, 375; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (1971).
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all damages. Of course, when the co-defendant has sufficient
insurance, then the problem is one for the insurance company
and not for the plaintiff. But when the private co-defendant has
an insurance policy limit and insufficient assets, these potential
outcomes become the plaintiffs problem. Either way, the deep-
est pocket of all is off-limits. 273
V. CONCLUSION
The inclusion of the United States as a defendant in an avia-
tion case can greatly complicate the choice-of-law issues. These
issues will be straightforward, or at least no more complex than
with private defendants, when the forum is also the place where
the government's negligence is alleged to have occurred. When
the government's negligence occurred outside the forum, coun-
sel for plaintiff should be aware that the choice-of-law rules ap-
plicable to the United States are those of the state where the
negligence took place, not those of the forum state. In a multi-
party action involving allegations of government negligence
outside the forum, there is the potential for a different choice-
of-law approach to apply to the claims against the United States
than the approach that applies to the claims against the private
defendants, a more likely occurrence these days as states increas-
ingly create their own approaches by blending various method-
ologies. Another layer of complexity is added when the
governmental negligence occurred in more than one jurisdic-
tion. If the pertinent jurisdictions' choice-of-law rules do not
conflict, then the court need not select between competing
choice-of-law rules as to the claims against the United States. If
the potentially applicable substantive laws do not conflict, then
the court need not even apply those choice-of-law rules. But if
the choice-of-law rules and the substantive laws conflict, then a
court could follow any one of the numerous approaches that
have been tried to resolve the problem of which jurisdiction's
choice-of-law rules to select and apply to the claims against the
United States. There is no consensus yet. Nevertheless, for
273 Practitioners should be aware that the opposite results can occur when the
law applicable to the United States renders the government jointly and severally
liable and the law applicable to the private co-defendant renders that defendant
severally liable. Although the United States would still only be liable for whatever
damages were recoverable under the applicable substantive law, plaintiffs are
markedly less fearful of this reverse scenario because there is little chance of a
damages short-fall when a defendant that prints its own money is jointly and sev-
erally liable.
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those courts not bound by mandatory precedent to apply a cer-
tain approach, the Third Circuit's test of selecting the choice-of-
law rules of the place where the last significant act occurred will
likely carry the day.
All of this analysis becomes interesting as a practical matter
(rather than simply as an academic exercise) when the method-
ology applicable to the United States selects different substan-
tive law than the approach applicable to the private defendant.
Such an outcome is most dramatic, and more likely to occur,
when one jurisdiction's choice-of-law rules do not follow an is-
sue-by-issue approach but mandate the application of one state's
law to the entire cause of action against either the United States
or the co-defendant, as occurs under the traditional choice-of-
law rules that are still alive and well in ten jurisdictions. De-
pending on the apportionment-of-fault law applicable to each
defendant, one of the parties-the plaintiff, the United States,
or the private co-defendant-could be left shouldering another
party's economic burden. This potential outcome should be
sufficient to spur counsel to begin pushing the "monstrous boul-
der" up the choice-of-law hill early in the case. By applying the
framework for analysis set forth in this article, counsel can push
the boulder uphill and topple it over the summit, thereby avoid-
ing the legal equivalent of Sisyphus' eternal fate.
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